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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. immigration system is the subject of an ongoing debate regarding 
necessary reforms to protect American national security and benefit all Americans 
economically. This thesis asks two questions: (1) How should the current U.S. 
immigration system be improved to address existing economic and national security 
concerns presented by legal immigration?, and (2) What elements from existing U.S. 
legal immigration programs, as well as from Canada’s and Australia’s legal immigration 
programs, can the United States incorporate in its revamped immigration policies? This 
thesis conducted a comparative analysis of the U.S. diversity immigrant visa and 
family-based immigration programs and existing merit-based immigration systems in 
Canada and Australia. The inquiry identified which of the aforementioned immigration 
programs have had a positive effect on their respective countries’ economies, based 
on levels of education and unemployment rates, and which immigration policies 
have resulted in fewer terrorist attacks by immigrants who come to each country, via 
relevant noted programs. This thesis found that although the U.S. diversity 
immigrant and family-based immigration programs are not perfect, they serve an 
important purpose and can be improved. This thesis recommends, among other things, 
introducing points-based human capital criteria into family-based immigration and 
instituting a five-year review of the U.S. immigration system. 
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The U.S. immigration system is the subject of an ongoing debate regarding 
necessary reforms to protect American national security and benefit all Americans 
economically.1 For instance, critics argue for the reduction of family-based immigrants in 
the United States. They contend the majority of immigrants enter the United States as legal 
permanent residents (LPRs) based on their familial ties rather than the skills they bring to 
the U.S. economy. Critics also believe that the U.S. diversity visa (DV) program or green 
card lottery—that allows 50,000 people to immigrate to the United States on a permanent 
basis—should be eliminated. They argue the program is fraught with fraud and creates 
national security concerns, such as allowing a number of terrorists into the United States, 
even if statistics reveal that the number of individuals admitted through the U.S. DV 
program (and family-based immigration) who have engaged in terrorist acts is minimal, 
when compared to the total number of immigrants admitted through these programs to the 
United States each year.2 Additionally, some critics argue that the two immigration 
programs financially burden the U.S. government and economy. In this context, the current 
administration, through the Reform American Immigration for Strong Employment 
(RAISE) Act, advocates refocusing the U.S. system to a merit-based immigration system 
similar to those implemented by Canada and Australia.3 Proponents call for an end to the 
DV program and a considerable reduction in family-based immigration pathways.4 To 
address those calls, this thesis asks the following questions:  
 
1 “What Immigration Reform Should Look Like,” Heritage Foundation, accessed December 13, 2019, 
https://www.heritage.org/immigration/heritage-explains/what-immigration-reform-should-look. 
2 “National Security Threats—Chain Migration and the Visa Lottery System,” White House, February 
1, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/national-security-threats-chain-migration-visa-lottery-
system/. 
3 RAISE Act, S. 1720, 115th Cong., 1st sess., August 2, 2017, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/senate-bill/1720/text; Muzaffar Chishti and Jessica Bolter, “Merit-Based Immigration: Trump 
Proposal Would Dramatically Revamp Immigrant Selection Criteria, but with Modest Effects on 
Numbers,” Migration Policy Institute, May 30, 2019, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/merit-based-
immigration-trump-proposal-immigrant-selection. 
4 RAISE Act; Chishti and Bolter. 
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• How should the current U.S. immigration system be improved to address 
existing economic and national security concerns presented by legal 
immigration?  
• What elements from existing U.S. legal immigration programs, as well as 
from Canada’s and Australia’s legal immigration programs, can the United 
States incorporate in its revamped immigration policies?  
In answering these research questions, this thesis conducted a comparative analysis 
of select U.S. and other countries’ immigration policies.5 Specifically, this research first 
reviewed and analyzed the U.S. DV and family-based immigration programs, as they are 
currently under consideration for revision in the most recent proposed legislation, the 
RAISE Act. Additionally, this thesis examined existing merit-based immigration systems 
in Canada and Australia. In this context, the investigation examined immigration programs 
in light of their economic and national security impacts in their respective countries. In 
terms of impact to the economy, the inquiry identified which of the aforementioned 
immigration programs—the U.S., Canadian, and Australian—have had a positive effect on 
their respective countries’ economies, based on levels of education and unemployment 
rates. In terms of impact to national security, the investigation identified and analyzed 
which immigration policies have resulted in fewer terrorist attacks by immigrants who 
come to each country, via relevant noted programs. Ultimately, in light of proposed 
revisions to existing immigration legislation, this thesis—using lessons learned from the 
U.S., Canadian, and Australian immigration policies—provided a set of policy 
recommendations for U.S. policymakers to consider as they search for answers to improve 
the U.S. immigration system.  
 
5 Eugene Bardach and Eric M. Patashnik, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to 
More Effective Problem Solving, 5th ed. (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2016), 1–189; Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security, “Policy Analysis and Policy Options Analysis,” May 22, 2017, YouTube, video, 
15:47, https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=11&v=FjIoKJhdcIg&feature=emb_logo; Luciana 
Herman, Tips for Writing Policy Papers: A Policy Lab Communications Workshop (Stanford: Stanford 
Law School, 2013), 1–10, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/White-Papers-
Guidelines.pdf. 
xv 
This thesis found that although the U.S. DV and family-based immigration 
programs are not perfect, they serve an important purpose and can be improved. The DV 
program accepts immigrants who enrich and diversify the United States culturally and 
economically. Similarly, U.S. family-based immigrants enrich the U.S. economically, 
through investing in human capital, innovation, and entrepreneurship, as well as aid in 
immigrants’ economic integration.  
This thesis also found that the Canadian and Australian immigration systems have 
a number of benefits, including regular system re-evaluations and adjustments, highly 
educated immigrants, and immigrant integration services. Nonetheless, the Canadian and 
Australian immigration systems also have shortcomings. Both the Canadian and Australian 
merit-based systems lead to underemployment of highly skilled immigrants. Additionally, 
the Canadian merit-based system creates low-skilled labor shortages, while the Australian 
system promulgates de-facto means of low-skilled labor employment. Moreover, Canadian 
and Australian merit-based systems present several barriers when it comes to the 
incorporation and implementation in the United States. For instance, U.S. geography, large 
population, and system of governance differ from those of Canada and Australia and create 
barriers to implementing a merit-based system in the United States.  
Based on the assessment of the U.S. DV and family-based immigration programs 
and merit-based systems in Canada and Australia, this thesis recommends that the United 
States implement the following changes to its immigration system, to improve the DV and 
family-based immigration programs and address the primary concerns of critics of both 
programs: 
• raise minimum educational and experiential requirements for the DV 
program; 
• introduce points-based human capital criteria into family-based 
immigration; 
• institute a five-year review of the U.S. immigration system; 
xvi 
• investigate national security vetting immigrant programs using the model 
of Canada and Australia; 
• implement additional measures to reduce identity fraud in the DV 
program; and 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The U.S. immigration system is facing an ongoing debate about how it can be 
reformed to protect American national security and benefit all Americans economically.1 
President Donald Trump and the RAISE Act advocate for a merit-based immigration 
system similar to the ones implemented by Canada and Australia.2 They call for the end of 
the diversity immigrant visa (DV) program and a considerable reduction in family-based 
immigration pathways.3  
However, according to some commentators, a complete overhaul of the U.S. 
immigration to a merit-based system will not improve U.S. immigration but may instead 
create additional issues.4 Critics of the merit-based system note that this form of 
immigration may not be suitable for the United States because it differs from Australia and 
Canada in many ways, including geography, size of the population, and system of 
governance.5 Additionally, some immigration experts argue that the DV program and 
family-based immigration have merit, as they diversify the U.S. population and promote 
 
1 “What Immigration Reform Should Look Like,” Heritage Foundation, accessed December 13, 2019, 
https://www.heritage.org/immigration/heritage-explains/what-immigration-reform-should-look. 
2 RAISE Act, S. 1720, 115th Cong., 1st sess., August 2, 2017, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/senate-bill/1720/text; Muzaffar Chishti and Jessica Bolter, “Merit-Based Immigration: Trump 
Proposal Would Dramatically Revamp Immigrant Selection Criteria, but with Modest Effects on 
Numbers,” Migration Policy Institute, May 30, 2019, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/merit-based-
immigration-trump-proposal-immigrant-selection. 
3 RAISE Act; Chishti and Bolter. 
4 Tania Karas, “Can a ‘Merit-Based’ Immigration System Like Canada’s or Australia’s Work in the 
U.S.?,” Public Radio International, May 17, 2019, https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-05-17/can-merit-based-
immigration-system-modeled-canada-or-australia-work-us; Ray Marshall, “Value Added Immigration: 
Lessons for the United States from Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom,” Economic Policy Institute, 
2011, https://www.epi.org/publication/value-added-immigration/. 
5 Marshall; Karas. 
2 
immigrant integration, for example, but these programs need to be improved.6 For instance, 
the DV program is costly and administratively burdensome and presents fraud concerns.7 
Similarly, family-based immigration may be too broad and taxing on U.S. economic 
resources.8  
Consequently, this thesis provides recommendations for an improved immigration 
system, limited in scope to the DV program and family-based immigration. It will identify 
the aspects of the current U.S. immigration system, specifically regarding the 
aforementioned programs, which need to be improved, and recommend improvements in 
terms of national security and economic concerns. This thesis also examines and 
recommends aspects of the Canadian and Australian merit-based systems that can be 
incorporated into the improved U.S. immigration system.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• How should the current U.S. immigration system be improved to address 
existing economic and national security concerns presented by legal 
immigration?  
 
6 Diversity Visa Program: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and 
Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2005, 
4–8, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg21780/pdf/CHRG-109hhrg21780.pdf; Andowah 
A. Newton, “Injecting Diversity into U.S. Immigration Policy: The Diversity Visa Program and the 
Missing Discourse on Its Impact on African Immigration to the United States,” Cornell International Law 
Journal 38, no. 3 (2005): 1049–82, https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol38/iss3/18/; “AILA Policy 
Brief: The Value of Family-Based Immigration,” American Immigration Lawyers Association, January 8, 
2018, https://www.aila.org/infonet/aila-policy-brief-the-value-of-family-based-immig. 
7 Diversity Visa Program and Its Susceptibility to Fraud and Abuse: Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 
108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2004, 32, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg93387/pdf/CHRG-
108hhrg93387.pdf; Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors Office, Diversity Visa 
Program, Report No. ISP-CA-03-52 (Washington, DC: Department of States, 2003), 2, 
https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/37437.pdf. 
8 William A. Kandel, U.S. Family-based Immigration Policy, CRS Report No. R43145 (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 22–23. 
3 
• What elements from existing U.S. legal immigration programs, as well as 
from Canada’s and Australia’s legal immigration programs, can the United 
States incorporate in its revamped immigration policies?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review addresses three areas of immigration that can be used to 
improve the current U.S. immigration system. The first section focuses on research and 
reports related to the DV program, the second discusses research on family-based 
immigration, and the third addresses literature on merit-based immigration systems. 
1. Diversity Visa  
One of the debates in the literature regarding the DV program focuses on whether 
the program truly diversifies the U.S. population. Some literature argues that the program 
is discriminatory and does not increase diversity, as it excludes certain races or ethnic 
groups.9 For instance, Jan Ting argues that the DV program purposely excludes Asian and 
other ethnic immigrants and “has been a transparent device to issue more visas to white 
immigrants.”10 Ting views the exclusion of natives of certain countries, such as China and 
Vietnam, from participating in the DV lottery as discriminatory and believes that it is based 
solely on their ethnicity.11 He argues that the criteria used to exclude certain countries, 
because more than 50,000 people from those countries immigrated to the United States in 
the past five years, is arbitrary.12 According to Ting, DVs are unfair because “they were 
created to offset the diversity which would otherwise result from nondiscriminatory 
immigration.”13 He argues for changing the DV program to an immigration lottery “open 
 
9 H.R., Diversity Visa Program and Its Susceptibility to Fraud and Abuse, 3. 
10 Jan C. Ting, “‘Other Than a Chinaman’: How U.S. Immigration Law Resulted from and Still 
Reflects a Policy of Excluding and Restricting Asian Immigration,” Temple Political & Civil Rights Law 
Review 4, no. 301 (1994–1995): 315, 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/tempcr4&div=18&id=&page=. 
11 Ting, 310. 
12 Ting, 309. 
13 H.R., Diversity Visa Program and Its Susceptibility to Fraud and Abuse, 13. 
4 
equally to natives of every country and region of the world.”14 Similarly, Jonathan H. 
Wardle argues that the program combines Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America 
with continental South America as one region to curtail the number of diversity visas 
allocated to natives of these regions to benefit prospective European immigrants.15 As does 
Ting, Wardle advocates for a random lottery approach that is equitable and does not look 
at an applicant’s country of origin, nationality, or ethnicity.16  
In contrast, others argue that the DV program is not discriminatory but creates 
diversity. For example, Andowah A. Newton argues that the DV program enhances U.S. 
diversity by providing immigration opportunities to Africans who have been 
underrepresented in terms of immigration to the United States.17 By the same token, Anna 
O. Law claims that although the DV program was created primarily to benefit European 
immigrants, such as Irish and Italians, it has had unintended consequences by benefiting 
different groups of individuals, including Africans.18 However, a caveat can be made to 
the argument presented by Newton and Law in the existing literature. Some argue that 
although the DV program may be benefiting the United States by diversifying it with 
African immigrants, it has negative consequences for African countries. In an article by B. 
Ikubolajeh Logan and Kevin J. A. Thomas, and another by Rotimi Sankore, the authors 
indicate that the program leads to brain drain from African countries, thus hampering their 
development.19 In sum, differing opinions are presented as to whether the DV program 
truly promotes diversity in the United States, and even those who believe the program 
promotes diversity, suggest it leads to a number of negative unanticipated consequences 
for the participating countries.  
 
14 Ting, “‘Other Than a Chinaman,’” 310. 
15 Jonathan H. Wardle, “The Strategic Use of Mexico to Restrict South American Access to the 
Diversity Visa Lottery,” Vanderbilt Law Review 58, no. 6 (November 2005): 1963–99. 
16 Wardle, 1994. 
17 Newton, “Injecting Diversity into U.S. Immigration Policy,” 1051. 
18 Anna O. Law, “The Diversity Visa Lottery: A Cycle of Unintended Consequences in United States 
Immigration Policy,” Journal of American Ethnic History 21, no. 4 (2002): 3–29, JSTOR. 
19 Rotimi Sankore, “Africa Killing Us Softly,” New African, November 2005; B. Ikubolajeh Logan and 
Kevin J. A. Thomas, “The U.S. Diversity Visa Programme and the Transfer of Skills from Africa,” 
International Migration 50, no. 2 (2012): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2011.00711.x. 
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Other scholars advocate eliminating the DV program altogether. Cassidy Cloninger 
argues that the primary goal of U.S. immigration should be reuniting families because it 
benefits American society socially and economically, and the DV program is inconsistent 
with that goal.20 It creates disparities in terms of visa opportunities for family-based 
immigrants.21 Accordingly, Cloninger argues for the reallocation of 50,000 DV program 
visas to the family-based immigration categories.22 Although Cloninger states at the 
beginning of her article that she will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the DV 
program, she fails to consider its advantages and focuses exclusively on its shortcomings. 
Melissa Chapasca also argues for reallocating 50,000 DVs but to a merit-based points 
system, where points are awarded based on an individual’s employment-related skills or 
familial ties to the United States.23 However, Chapasca fails to provide an in-depth analysis 
of a merit-based point system and thus does not consider its possible drawbacks for the 
United States. Therefore, Cloninger’s and Chapasca’s arguments lack a complete analysis 
for eliminating or replacing the DV program.  
Another set of literature comes from government sources and primarily argues that 
the DV program generates national security concerns. Publications from the White House 
and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) call for the elimination of the DV program 
due to national security concerns.24 Furthermore, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) has cited fraud and national security concerns within the DV program.25 In the past, 
 
20 Cassidy Cloninger, “Employment and Diversity-Based Visas: Why Birthright Citizenship Is Not All 
That Is Wrong with America’s Immigration System,” Campbell Law Review 39 (Spring 2017): 413–55. 
21 Cloninger, 418. 
22 Cloninger, 440. 
23 Melissa Chapaska, “The Immigration Gamble: Eliminating the Diversity Visa Program,” Widener 
Journal of Law, Economics & Race 5, no. 1 (Fall 2013): 67–84. 
24 “National Security Threats—Chain Migration and the Visa Lottery System,” White House, February 
1, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/national-security-threats-chain-migration-visa-lottery-
system/; “We Need to End Unchecked Chain Migration and Eliminate the Reckless Visa Lottery to Secure 
the Nation and Protect the American Worker,” Department of Homeland Security, February 15, 2018, 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/02/15/we-need-end-unchecked-chain-migration-and-eliminate-reckless-
visa-lottery-secure. 
25 Jess T. Ford, Border Security: Fraud Risks Complicate State’s Ability to Manage Diversity Visa 
Program, GAO-07-1174 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2007), 1–46, 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1174. 
6 
calls for the elimination of the DV program have generated numerous congressional 
hearings, which have drawn attention to its national security implications and potential for 
fraud, among other concerns.26  
The majority of the scholarly literature does not fully analyze the benefits of the 
diversity visa but instead focuses on its shortcomings. Additionally, scholarly literature 
does not fully explain or respond to the national security issues presented by the White 
House and DHS. Finally, the literature is lacking in terms of providing policy 
recommendations for how to improve the DV program.  
2. Family-Based Immigration  
The debate in the literature on family-based immigration centers primarily on 
whether the U.S. immigration system should be designed to benefit the U.S. economy 
rather than focus on family reunification. For instance, David C. Koelsch argues that 
family-based immigration does not assist the United States in terms of economic growth 
and calls for overhauling it by instituting various policy changes, including increasing 
employment-based visas and adopting merit-based point systems similar to the ones in 
Canada and Australia.27 Although Koelsch acknowledges that the proposed policy changes 
may have unintended consequences, he does not thoroughly discuss or analyze them.28 
White House and DHS publications also argue that the current family-based immigration 
system does not benefit the U.S. economy.29 However, the literature that argues against 
family-based immigration fails to address or refute arguments for family-based 
immigration. For instance, Harriet Duleep and Mark Regets argue that family-based 
 
26 H.R., Diversity Visa Program, 1–59; Diversity Visa Program and Its Susceptibility to Fraud and 
Abuse; Safe for America Act: Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the Committee on 
the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 112th Cong., 1st sess., April 5, 2011, 1–62, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg65602/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg65602.pdf. 
27 Judith Gans, Elaine M. Replogle, and Daniel J. Tichenor, Debates on U.S. Immigration (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2012), 388–392. 
28 Gans, Replogle, and Tichenor, 392. 
29 White House, “National Security Threats”; Department of Homeland Security, “We Need to End 
Unchecked Chain Migration.” 
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immigrants are benefiting the U.S. economy through their high-earning growth.30 
Similarly, Carol L. Cleveland states that family-based immigrants contribute to economic 
growth through entrepreneurship.31 All in all, the literature on whether family-based 
immigration is economically beneficial to the United States is split.  
Others argue that in addition to economic benefits, family-based immigration has 
further advantages. Zoya Gubernskaya and Joanna Dreby argue that family unity should 
be the priority of the U.S. immigration system, due to its many benefits.32 Gubernskaya 
and Dreby contend, “families are a buffer that aids immigrant integration, provides a social 
and economic safety net for new Americans, helps incorporate, and builds new businesses 
in the United States.”33 Some authors state that the primary focus should be on the family. 
For instance, Ashley Poonia argues for reforming family-based immigration in the United 
States but by expanding it rather than curtailing it.34 She argues for extending family-based 
immigration in the United States to new family groups, such as grandparents.35 She states 
that focusing exclusively on economic outcomes leads to an unjust immigration system 
and devalues the importance of family.36 In short, some authors argue that family-based 
immigration benefits the United States in a variety of ways.  
Conversely, White House and DHS publications contend that family-based 
immigration undermines U.S. national security and has allowed terrorists and criminals to 
enter the United States.37 Although scholarly literature addresses the economic argument 
 
30 Harriet Duleep and Mark Regets, “U.S. Immigration Policy at a Crossroads: Should the U.S. 
Continue Its Family-Friendly Policy?,” International Migration Review 48, no. 3 (2014): 823–45. 
31 Gans, Replogle, and Tichenor, Debates on U.S. Immigration, 393. 
32 Zoya Gubernskaya and Joanna Dreby, “U.S. Immigration Policy and the Case for Family Unity,” 
Journal on Migration and Human Security 5, no. 2 (2017): 417–39. 
33 Gubernskaya and Dreby, 426. 
34 Ashley Poonia, “Note: We Are All Family: Broadening the Family-Based Immigration System to 
Include Extended Family Members,” University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 93, no. 159 (Winter 2016): 
159–82. 
35 Poonia, 159. 
36 Poonia, 179. 
37 White House, “National Security Threats”; Department of Homeland Security, “We Need to End 
Unchecked Chain Migration.” 
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presented by critics of family-based immigration, the literature does not cover the national 
security issues presented by the White House and DHS.  
3. Merit-Based Immigration  
The argument regarding merit-based immigration focuses on whether such a system 
is economically beneficial for immigrants and countries. Some posit that a merit-based 
system is economically advantageous because it attracts better-quality immigrants. George 
J. Borjas argues that Canadian immigrants are more skilled than U.S. immigrants are 
because Canadian immigrants are better educated and U.S. immigrants face lower wages 
than most natives do.38 Borjas also argues that high-skilled immigration has a positive 
fiscal impact on countries because “high-skilled immigrants earn more, pay higher taxes, 
and require fewer services than low-skilled immigrants.”39  
However, the proponents of merit-based systems largely fail to acknowledge their 
drawbacks. Grace H. Parsons states, “As Canada, and particularly Australia, have shown, 
an immigration scheme which favors high-skilled applicants rather than reflecting the 
actual job-market needs could have subtle negative effects for both arriving workers and 
receiving countries.”40 According to Parsons, skilled immigrants who enter Canada 
struggle to obtain the necessary accreditation to work in Canada and face 
underemployment, while Canada faces labor shortages in unskilled labor. In Australia, 
skilled immigrants are competing for unskilled jobs.41 Similarly, Arif Anwar argues that 
skilled Canadian immigrants face a highly competitive labor market, where their foreign 
 
38 George Borjas, Immigration Policy, National Origin, and Immigrant Skills: A Comparison of 
Canada and the United States (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991), 1–28, 
https://doi.org/10.3386/w3691. 
39 Employment-based Permanent Immigration: Examining the Value of a Skilled-Based Point System: 
Hearing of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pension, Senate, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 2006, 
13. 
40 Grace H. Parsons, “An Overview of the U.S. Immigration System and Comparison with Merit-Based 
Immigration Systems in Light of the Proposed Raise Act,” Arizona Journal of International & 
Comparative Law Review 35, no. 3 (2018): 497, http://arizonajournal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/03_Parsons.pdf.  
41 Parsons, 490. 
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credentials are not readily accepted.42 Correspondingly, Douglas S. Massey argues that 
admitting immigrants just because of their skills is problematic.43 According to Massey, 
Canadian immigrants fail to integrate due to their inability to find suitable professional 
employment, yet both Australia and Canada face labor shortages in unskilled jobs.44 To 
summarize, some authors argue that merit-based immigration has economic benefits for 
the countries and immigrants while other authors dispute that finding.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis aspires to identify how existing U.S. immigration policies and programs 
can be strengthened or improved. To this end, it conducts a comparative analysis of select 
U.S. and other countries’ immigration policies.45 Specifically, this research first reviews 
and analyzes the U.S. DV and family-based immigration programs, as they are under 
consideration for revision in the most recent proposed legislation, the RAISE Act. One of 
the reasons this thesis studies the DV and family-based immigration programs is the 
arguments that these programs are vulnerable to national security concerns and serve as 
avenues for terrorists to enter the United States. Another contention is that these programs 
do not advance U.S. economic interests and should be eliminated or overhauled.  
Additionally, this thesis examines merit-based immigration systems in Canada and 
Australia. Specifically, the Canadian family reunification program and points-based 
Federal Skilled Worker Program, as well as the Australian family program and points-
based Skilled Independent Visa Program are examined. One reason for studying merit-
based immigration systems is that the aim of the RAISE Act is to implement a comparable 
 
42 Arif Anwar, “Canadian Immigration Policy: Micro and Macro Issues with the Points Based 
Assessment System,” Canadian Ethnic Studies 46, no. 1 (2014): 169–79, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/ces.2014.0004. 
43 S., Employment-based Permanent Immigration, 18–21. 
44 S., 18–19. 
45 Eugene Bardach and Eric M. Patashnik, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path 
to More Effective Problem Solving, 5th ed. (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2016), 1–189; Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security, “Policy Analysis and Policy Options Analysis,” May 22, 2017, YouTube, video, 
15:47, https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=11&v=FjIoKJhdcIg&feature=emb_logo; Luciana 
Herman, Tips for Writing Policy Papers: A Policy Lab Communications Workshop (Stanford: Stanford 
Law School, 2013), 1–10, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/White-Papers-
Guidelines.pdf. 
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system in the United States. The argument is that economic and national security concerns 
of the United States are better served by curbing family immigration and instating a 
merit/points-based system in which immigrants are required to meet a specific set of 
criteria before being considered for admission to a country.  
In this context, this investigation examines immigration programs in light of their 
economic and national security impacts in their respective countries. In terms of impact to 
the economy, the inquiry focuses on which of the aforementioned immigration programs—
the U.S., Canadian, and Australian programs—have had a positive effect on their 
respective countries’ economy, based on levels of education and unemployment rates. In 
terms of impact to national security, the investigation identifies and analyzes which of the 
immigration policies result in fewer terrorist attacks by immigrants who come to each 
country via the relevant noted programs. Ultimately, in light of proposed revisions to 
existing immigration legislation, this thesis—using lessons learned from the U.S., 
Canadian, and Australian immigration policies—provides a set of policy recommendations 
for U.S. policymakers to consider as they search for answers to improve the U.S. 
immigration system.46  
This research relies on open-source, published documents. It consults primary 
sources, such as government reports, congressional hearings, existing proposed legislation, 
as well as secondary sources, such as academic journal articles, books, and news articles. 
No data was collected through surveys or interviews.  
  
 
46 Recommended policy changes are analyzed to account for any limitations, downsides, precursors 
(e.g., an act of Congress), implications, or potential unintended consequences. This thesis focuses 
exclusively on legal immigration and does not delve into employment-based or asylum/refugee 
immigration. An analysis of the entire U.S. immigration system, as well as other countries’ immigration 
systems in addition to Canada and Australia, would be too broad. 
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E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides an overview of the DV program, including its history, current 
status, eligibility and vetting criteria, and presents arguments and counterarguments 
regarding national security and economic concerns associated with the program. Chapter 
III discusses the U.S. family-based immigration program, including its history, current 
state, eligibility criteria, and vetting process, as well as addresses arguments and 
counterarguments in relation to national security and economic challenges correlated with 
the program. Chapter IV explores the Canadian and Australian immigration systems, 
including their points-based and family-based programs, the systems’ drawbacks and 
advantages, and national security vetting and concerns. Chapter V concludes with analysis 
and recommendations.  
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II. DIVERSITY VISA PROGRAM 
On July 19, 2019, Ken Cuccinelli, then-acting director of the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), tweeted, “The diversity lottery is very 
dangerous, and it needs to go. Time for a more merit focused immigration system without 
dangerous holes like the diversity lottery.”47 This sentiment, at the highest levels of USCIS, 
reflects the current prevailing mistrust of the DV program. The question is how much of a 
threat to national security and economic security the DV program (commonly known as 
the “green card lottery”) poses. This chapter provides an overview of this immigration 
program. First, it discusses the background of the diversity visa, including its history, 
current status, eligibility, and vetting criteria. Second, it addresses national security and 
economic challenges facing the DV program. Third, it presents counterarguments to the 
criticisms and described challenges of the DV program. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The DV program was instituted by the Immigration Act of 1990 to stimulate 
immigration from mainly European countries, which became underrepresented in the 
United States as the result of the Immigration Amendments of 1965.48 Before 1965, U.S. 
immigration policies operated on the quota system, which allowed entry based on an 
individual’s race and national origin, favoring immigrants from European countries, and 
immigration from Italy and Ireland was open.49 The Immigration Amendments of 1965 
 
47 USCIS Acting Director Ken Cuccinelli (@USCISCuccinelli), “The diversity lottery is very 
dangerous, and it needs to go. @realDonaldTrump and I both want to see it ended. Time for a more merit-
focused immigration system w/o dangerous holes like the diversity lottery! Yikes,” Twitter, July 19, 2019, 
2:02 p.m., https://twitter.com/USCISCuccinelli/status/1152322796707598336. 
48 Immigration Act of 1990, Public Law 101–649, § 131, 175 (1990), 32–35, 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/03/04/IMMACT1990.pdf; David S. Weissbrodt 
and Laura Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell, 5th ed. (St. Paul: Thomson/West, 
2005), 33. 
49 Becky Little, “The ‘Diversity’ Green Card Lottery Was Originally for White Immigrants,” History, 
updated March 7, 2019, https://www.history.com/news/the-diversity-green-card-lottery-was-originally-for-
white-immigrants. 
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eliminated the quota system and allowed 20,000 immigrants per country annually.50 
Additionally, immigrants were evaluated based on certain criteria, such as established 
family members in the United States, certain job skills, or refugee status.51 The 
amendments also limited immigration from Western and Eastern Hemispheres to 120,000 
and 170,000 persons per year, respectively.52 Consequently, in the following decades, these 
changes led to higher immigration rates from Asian and Latin American countries, to the 
detriment of European immigrants.53 For example, it became harder for Irish and Italian 
citizens to immigrate to the United States legally.54  
In the 1980s, many Irish came to the United States and, due to Ireland’s economic 
crisis, remained as undocumented immigrants after their tourist visas expired.55 Irish-
American groups lobbied to prevent deportations of these undocumented Irish 
immigrants.56 Accordingly, Congress responded with Section 314 of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), or the NP-5 pilot lottery program, which 
benefited individuals from European countries whose ability to immigrate to the United 
States had been negatively affected after the amendments of 1965.57 The NP-5 program 
allotted an additional 5,000 immigrant visas a year in fiscal years 1987 and 1988 to natives 
of 36 countries that had been adversely affected by the 1965 amendments.58 The visas were 
distributed on a first-come, first-served basis to the applicants and their immediate family 
 
50 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Public Law 89–236, 12 (1965), 911–912, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-79/pdf/STATUTE-79-Pg911.pdf. 
51 Weissbrodt and Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell, 17. 
52 Little, “The ‘Diversity’ Green Card Lottery Was Originally for White Immigrants.” 
53 Weissbrodt and Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell, 27; Little. 
54 Little. 
55 Priscilla Alvarez, “The Diversity Visa Program Was Created to Help Irish Immigrants,” The 
Atlantic, November 1, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/diversity-visa-
program/544646/; Little. 
56 Little. 
57 Weissbrodt and Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell, 27–28. 
58 Ruth Ellen Wasem, Diversity Immigrant Visa Lottery Issues, CRS Report No. R41747 (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 1, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41747.pdf.  
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members.59 To be eligible for the NP-5 program, applicants had to meet only nationality, 
health, and moral requirements.60 Approximately 1.4 million individuals applied for the 
10,000 available visas, and 40 percent of these visas went to natives of Ireland, who 
submitted 200,000 of the first applications.61 Congress extended the NP-5 program by two 
more years and allocated 15,000 annual immigrant visas in fiscal years 1989 and 1990.62  
In 1988, Congress created another visa lottery program called OP-1 to increase 
“geographic diversity.”63 The OP-1 program was open to natives of all countries but the 
12 with the greatest influx of immigrants.64 Natives of 162 countries, who used less than 
25 percent of their maximum allotments in fiscal year 1988, qualified to participate in this 
program.65 The program was proposed by Representative Howard L. Berman, Democrat 
from California, who indicated, “it was a ‘stopgap measure’ designed to balance inequities 
in immigration law that favor people from Asia and Latin America.”66  
The DV program was created on a permanent basis in the same vein as NP-5 and 
OP-1, which were temporary lottery programs, to grant preference to the natives of those 
countries who did not immigrate to the United States regularly.67 From fiscal year 1992 to 
1994, 40 percent of the visas were reserved for Irish immigrants.68 Again, reserving visas 
 
59 Weissbrodt and Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell, 27; Alvarez, “The 
Diversity Visa Program Was Created to Help Irish Immigrants.” 
60 Weissbrodt and Danielson, 27–28. 
61 Marvine Howe, “Immigrants to Get Visas by Lottery,” New York Times, sec. U.S., March 1, 1989, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/01/us/immigrants-to-get-visas-by-lottery.html; Alvarez, “The Diversity 
Visa Program Was Created to Help Irish Immigrants”; Ashley Dunn, “U.S. Plans Lottery with Jackpot of 
Legal Residency: Immigration: Officials Brace for Deluge of Applicants for 40,000 Visas. Critics Say the 
Process Favors Europeans,” Los Angeles Times, September 6, 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-
xpm-1991-09-06-mn-1739-story.html. 
62 Wasem, Diversity Immigrant Visa Lottery Issues, 28. 
63 Weissbrodt and Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell, 28; Howe, “Immigrants 
to Get Visas by Lottery,” 19. 
64 Howe, “Immigrants to Get Visas by Lottery”; Dunn, “U.S. Plans Lottery with Jackpot of Legal 
Residency.” 
65 Weissbrodt and Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell, 28. 
66 Howe, “Immigrants to Get Visas by Lottery,” 2. 
67 Weissbrodt and Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell, 33. 
68 Wasem, Diversity Immigrant Visa Lottery Issues, 14; Little, “The ‘Diversity’ Green Card Lottery 
Was Originally for White Immigrants.” 
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for the Irish was designed to help the undocumented Irish immigrants who were already in 
the United States.69 By the mid-1990s, Ireland’s economy had improved, and the DV 
program was amended to remove a preference for the Irish.70 Although many Europeans 
still immigrate to the United States through this program, residents of African countries get 
the majority of the visas.71 
1. Diversity Visa Today 
The DV program allows immigrants to gain legal permanent residence or green 
cards in the United States.72 Those who gain permanent residence through the DV program, 
like any other LPR, have certain rights and responsibilities. They are allowed to live and 
work permanently in the United States, are protected by the federal, state, and local laws, 
and enjoy a wide spectrum of rights and freedoms.73 For instance, LPRs are allowed to 
enter certain branches of the U.S. military and have the right to receive Medicare, Social 
Security, and Supplemental Security Income, if eligible.74 Conversely, LPRs are expected 
to follow all U.S. laws, which require them to pay taxes and abstain from voting in 
elections, which are open only to U.S. citizens.75 LPRs who disobey U.S. laws could lose 
their permanent residence and be ordered removed from the country.76  
Currently, the DV program is a permanent program, which allots 55,000 visas per 
fiscal year from eligible countries.77 However, starting with fiscal year 1999, each year 
5,000 of these visas have been temporarily apportioned to an unrelated immigration 
 
69 Little. 
70 Weissbrodt and Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell, 33; Little. 
71 Little. 
72 Weissbrodt and Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell, 128–130; Wasem, 
Diversity Immigrant Visa Lottery Issues, 1. 
73 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, ed., Welcome to the United States: A Guide for New 
Immigrants (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2015), 14. 
74 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 14. 
75 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 24–25. 
76 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 24. 
77 “[USC02] 8 USC 1153: Allocation of Immigrant Visas,” Office of the Law Revision Counsel, 
United States Code, accessed July 24, 2019, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid%3AUSC-
prelim-title8-section1153&num=0&edition=prelim. 
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program, the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), which was enacted 
in 1997 and stipulated the apportionment.78 It is unclear why the annual 5,000 permanent 
resident visas for NACARA were reallocated from the DV program rather than other 
immigration programs, such as family-based or employment-based visas. Under 
NACARA, the 5,000 visas are made available to certain Salvadoran, Nicaraguan, Cuban, 
Guatemalan, and former Soviet asylum seekers, who may become legal permanent 
residents if they meet certain requirements.79 Thus, only 50,000 visas are available to 
applicants of the DV program.80  
A computer, akin to a lottery selection, selects the winners randomly.81 Although 
only 50,000 visas are available, the Department of State (DOS) notifies a greater number 
of applicants, in the expectation that not every individual will apply or qualify for the visa; 
the “oversale” ensures that all 50,000 visas are issued.82 For instance, in fiscal year 2018, 
approximately 115,968 applicants were notified and allowed to apply for a visa, but only 
50,000 visas were issued.83 The number of total entrants in the lottery, excluding 
derivatives (i.e., immediate family members), has grown from year to year: 11,391,146 in 
fiscal year 2016, 12,437,190 in fiscal year 2017, and 14,692,258 in fiscal year 2018.84 It is 
apparent from these numbers that the likelihood of selection is very slim.  
 
78 District of Columbia Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1998, Public Law 105–100, § 201, 111 Stat. 2193 
(1997), https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ100/PLAW-105publ100.pdf; “DV 2018—Selected 
Entrants,” Department of State, accessed February 6, 2020, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-
visas/immigrate/diversity-visa-program-entry/dv-2018-selected-entrants.html; Wasem, Diversity Immigrant 
Visa Lottery Issues, 1–2. 
79 Wasem, 2. 
80 Department of State, “DV 2018—Selected Entrants.” 
81 Department of State, Instructions for the 2020 Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (DV-2020) 
(Washington, DC: Department of States, n.d.), 1, accessed September 1, 2019, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Diversity-Visa/DV-Instructions-Translations/DV-2020-
Instructions-Translations/DV-2020-Instructions-English.pdf. 
82 Department of State, “DV 2018—Selected Entrants.” 
83 Department of State. 
84 Department of State, DV AES Statistics by FSC 2016–2018 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 
n.d.), 6, accessed September 2, 2019, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Diversity-
Visa/DVStatistics/DV%20AES%20statistics%20by%20FSC%202016-2018.pdf. 
18 
2. Eligibility Criteria 
Not all countries are eligible for the DV program. Each year, the DOS provides a 
list of ineligible countries; the ones that had more than 50,000 of its natives immigrate to 
the United States as legal permanent residents in the past five years.85 For fiscal year 2020, 
the DOS announced the following ineligible countries:  
Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China (mainland-born), Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Peru, Philippines, South Korea, United Kingdom (except Northern Ireland) 
and its dependent territories, and Vietnam.86 
Eligible countries, on the other hand, are low admission countries, which means 
that fewer than 50,000 of their natives have been admitted to the United States as legal 
permanent residents in the last five years.87 This criterion is the sole threshold of eligibility 
of a given country.88 For instance, in fiscal year 2020, Japan, Kenya, Bulgaria and all other 
countries, except for the ineligible countries listed previously qualified for the diversity 
visa. The available visas are divided into six geographic regions: Africa, Europe, Asia, 
South America, North America, and Oceania.89 The natives of each eligible country receive 
no more than seven percent of the year’s available visas.90 Thus, the DV program 
distinguishes between eligible and ineligible countries.  
Applicants must also meet eligibility criteria. To qualify for the DV program, an 
applicant must have a high school diploma or equivalent, or two years in a position that 
requires two years of training or experience within the last five years of the DV 
application.91 Furthermore, the applicant or the applicant’s spouse or parent must have 
 
85 Department of State, Instructions for the 2020 Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, 1. 
86 Department of State, 1. 
87 Department of State, 1. 
88 Department of State, 1. 
89 Department of State, “DV 2018—Selected Entrants”; Office of the Law Revision Counsel, United 
States Code, “[USC02] 8 USC 1153: Allocation of Immigrant Visas.” 
90 Department of State; Office of the Law Revision Counsel, United States Code. 
91 Office of the Law Revision Counsel, United States Code; Department of State, Instructions for the 
2020 Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, 2. 
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been born in a country eligible for the diversity visa.92 Thus, if the applicant was born in 
Canada, but the applicant’s spouse was born in France, the applicant can claim her spouse’s 
country of birth (France) as her country of eligibility, as long as the applicant included her 
spouse on her DV entry.93 If the applicant was born in Canada, but her parents were born 
in Japan and were not residents of Canada at the time of the applicant’s birth, then the 
applicant could claim the country of birth (Japan) of either of her parents.94 Overall, in 
addition to meeting educational and experiential prerequisites, the applicants must meet 
country eligibility requirements.  
Applicants must follow several regulations when applying for the DV lottery. First, 
the application process involves submitting just one free online application within a 
designated period, which usually occurs in October of every fiscal year and lasts for 
approximately 30 days.95 Entrants who submit multiple applications per fiscal year are 
disqualified.96 Second, when applying for the DV lottery, per 22 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR), Section 42.33, applicants are required to list their spouse and all 
unmarried children under the age of 21, unless these immediate family members are U.S. 
citizens or legal permanent residents.97 Failure to list the required information on the 
application can lead to it being disqualified.98 Third, besides providing their biographical 
and other relevant information and that of their families, applicants must also provide their 
digital photograph and a photograph for each qualifying family member.99 After applying, 
 
92 Department of State, 1–2. 
93 “U.S. Diversity Immigrant Visa Program Tutorial: Submitting an Entry,” 2015, YouTube, video, 
25:06, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tOQlh2d2EbQ. 
94 YouTube. 
95 Department of State, Instructions for the 2020 Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, 2. 
96 Department of State, 2. 
97 “22 CFR § 42.33—Diversity Immigrant,” Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, accessed 
September 29, 2020, https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/22/42.33; Department of State, Instructions for 
the 2020 Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, 4–5. 
98 Department of State, Instructions for the 2021 Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (DV-2021) 
(Washington, DC: Department of State, n.d.), 3, accessed September 29, 2020, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Diversity-Visa/DV-Instructions-Translations/DV-2021-
Instructions-Translations/DV-2021-%20Instructions-English.pdf. 
99 Department of State, Instructions for the 2020 Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, 3. 
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the applicants receive a unique confirmation number and can monitor the status of their 
entry online.100 In sum, DV entrants must follow a number of rules to have their application 
entries qualify for the lottery.  
3. Vetting Process 
The background vetting process involves name and biometric checks, as well as an 
in-person interview.101 Consular officers at various U.S. embassies and consulates are 
required to obtain applicants’ fingerprints at the interview.102 Subsequently, consular 
officers screen applicants through the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), which 
contains records of visa applications, including photographs of applicants, 10-finger scans, 
comments by consular officers, and outcomes of any prior visa applications.103 The CCD 
is also linked with other U.S. agencies’ biometric databases, such as the DHS’s Automated 
Biometric Identification System (IDENT) and Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) 
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), which contain records of 
fingerprint scans.104  
Additionally, consular officers must check the background of applicants in the 
Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database.105 Specifically, officers 
perform name checks on applicants.106 If the applicant’s name generates a hit or if the 
applicant’s nationality or background needs additional vetting, then consular officers are 
required to request a security advisory opinion (SAO) from the intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies to conduct a further review of the applicant.107  
 
100 Department of State, 3. 
101 Ford, Border Security, 24. 
102 Ford, 24. 
103 Ruth Ellen Wasem, Visa Security Policy: Roles of the Departments of State and Homeland Security 
CRS Report No. R41093 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 7, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41093.pdf. 
104 Wasem, 7. 
105 Ford, Border Security; Wasem, Visa Security Policy, 7. 
106 Wasem, 7–8. 
107 Ford, Border Security, 24; Wasem, 8. 
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In addition to collecting fingerprints at interviews, consular officers must determine 
whether the applicants meet the aforementioned eligibility requirements.108 Furthermore, 
during the interview, consular officers determine if the principal applicant and dependents 
have a legitimate relationship.109 In other words, through interviews, consular officers 
attempt to determine whether the marriage between the primary DV applicant and spouse 
listed on the DV application is bona fide, and whether the DV applicant is a legal parent of 
children listed on the application.  
Moreover, the applicants have to undergo mental and physical examinations.110 
According to the 2007 GAO report on the diversity visa program, applicants can be found 
ineligible for a variety of reasons, including “certain adverse medical conditions, criminal 
behavior, security and terrorist concerns, and other factors.”111 These ineligibility criteria 
come from the grounds for inadmissibility, including “health-related grounds, criminal 
history, security and terrorists concerns, and public charge” concerns, listed under the 
Section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).112 For instance, under INA 
Section 212(a), applicants can be found ineligible for having a communicable disease, 
engaging in money laundering or prostitution, or being a member of or soliciting funds for 
a terrorist organization.113 
B. NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC CONCERNS 
The general objection by the opponents to the DV lottery comes in terms of national 
security issues. Critics of the DV program argue that the United States allows applicants 
from countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism: North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and 
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Syria.114 Under Section 306 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 
of 2002, individuals from these countries cannot even be issued nonimmigrant or tourist 
visas “unless it is determined such aliens do not pose a threat to the safety and national 
security of the United States.”115 Yet, under the DV program, individuals from these 
countries can be issued a legal permanent resident status or a green card.116 According to 
the DHS, 30,000 individuals from countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism 
entered the United States between 2007 and 2016.117 
Critics also underscore that some immigrants who have come to the United States 
through the DV program have committed or attempted to commit terrorist acts.118 The 
White House cites seven individuals who entered through the DV program or as a relative 
of a DV winner.119 One of the seven individuals is Sayfullo Saipov, a national of 
Uzbekistan, who entered the United States in 2010 as a DV winner, and in 2017, killed 
eight people and injured 11 others with a truck in New York City.120 Authorities found 
handwritten notes in Arabic, declaring allegiance to the Islamic State, near the truck.121  
The diversity visa is also vulnerable to various fraud schemes, which potential 
terrorists or criminals might use that may make the background checks insufficient. The 
program can be exploited through identity fraud, which is prevalent in DV program 
countries, partially due to poor vital recordkeeping.122 According to a 2003 report by the 
DOS Office of the Inspector General, as a result of the meager control over vital records in 
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some countries, “consular officers must assume that all travel, identity, and civil documents 
are unreliable.”123 Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether DV applicants are filing 
under false identities.  
Additionally, fraudulent identity documents can easily be obtained in many 
countries eligible for the DV program.124 In some countries, applicants can purchase 
legitimate official documents, such as passports, with false identities, or false identity 
documents can be easily procured.125 Consequently, according to a 2002 DOS cable cited 
in the GAO study, identity fraud “creates an ‘open door’ for terrorists wishing to enter the 
United States with legal status.”126 Moreover, although DOS conducts security screenings 
of DV applicants, applicants with newly minted identities may not be detected in various 
U.S. government databases, which make security checks useless.127 If a DV applicant does 
not have a previous record in U.S. government agency databases, which an applicant with 
a new false identity is unlikely to have, this applicant will not be identified as a potential 
national security concern.128  
Fraudulent marriages are another scheme that can be employed by terrorists.129 DV 
winners who marry after the initial lottery entry are allowed to add their spouses as 
beneficiaries to their applications.130 Accordingly, it is possible for terrorists to pay DV 
winners to engage in sham marriages and be added as spouses to the DV application.131 
Although the DOS vets the spouses, terrorist spouses who do not have a record in U.S. 
government agency databases may not be detected as potential national security 
concerns.132 Additionally, some applicants use visa agents to complete their DV 
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applications, and these agents are at times involved in facilitating sham DV marriages.133 
According to the GAO study, in some countries, “applicants engaging in sham marriages 
rely on backdated marriage certificates, fake supporting documentation, and staged 
wedding pictures,” and “the visa agents . . . coach them on how to answer questions about 
the relationship in the visa interview.”134 In sum, critics of the DV program argue that it 
presents national security concerns as it admits individuals from states that sponsor 
terrorism, accepts immigrants who later commit terrorist acts, and is susceptible to fraud 
schemes, which can be exploited by potential terrorists.  
Recently, Donald Trump has stated that the United States gets “the worst of the 
worst” through the DV program.135 Critics similarly contend that the diversity visa brings 
in people who do not have any ties to the United States.136 Unlike immigrants in other 
categories, DV immigrants typically do not have familial ties in the United States and are 
not coming for family reunification.137 Additionally, DV immigrants are not coming 
because of an employer petitioning for them, based on their skills. In fact, critics state that 
the preponderance of DV applicants lack “the advanced skills to contribute to our 
economy.”138 In other words, some argue the diversity visa attracts low-skilled individuals 
with only a high-school education, unlike highly skilled immigrants for whom employers 
are petitioning.  
Critics of the DV program also maintain that the program is administratively and 
financially exacting. During the 2004 congressional hearing on the DV program, Steven 
A. Camarota argued that the program is “administratively burdensome” and takes critical, 
limited resources away from processing immigrants who apply through other immigration 
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avenues, such as family-based or employment-based immigration.139 The DV program 
requires processing millions of DV entries to ensure that they meet minimal eligibility 
requirements, such as education and employment experience. Once the pool of eligible 
applicants is determined and the winners chosen, additional resources have to be expended 
to vet and adjudicate applications of the winners who apply for legal permanent 
residency.140 According to Camarota, “trying to weed out fraudulent lottery applications 
and even processing legitimate ones is a diversion for agencies that must identify terrorists 
among the millions seeking to come to the United States in other [immigration] 
categories.”141 Furthermore, the program creates a financial burden for the U.S. 
government because only the winners have to pay a fee to have their visa applications 
processed.142 In fiscal year 2002, the U.S. government had to pay over $840,000 in costs 
not covered by the DV program fees.143 Hence, according to the critics, the DV program is 
costly and consumes vital resources.  
Opponents to the diversity visa also argue that it is unfair that the DV winners are 
able to immigrate to the United States ahead of certain family and employment-based 
immigrants who have been waiting years for visa availability.144 According to the National 
Visa Center, as of November 1, 2018, 3,791,973 approved family-based and employment-
based petitions were awaiting visa availability.145 Family-based and employment-based 
visas are limited on an annual basis, and thus, not always immediately available. Generally, 
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226,000 family-based visas and 140,000 employment-based visas are granted annually.146 
Therefore, while over three million people with a family member or a job offer will  
have to wait years for their turn to enter the United States or become legal permanent 
residents, each year 50,000 DV winners will enter the United States and obtain LPR status 
ahead of them.  
Some critics argue that the program is discriminatory and does not increase 
diversity, as it excludes certain races or ethnic groups.147 For instance, Jan Ting argues the 
diversity visa purposely excludes Asian and other ethnic immigrants and “has been a 
transparent device to issue more visas to white immigrants.”148 Ting views the exclusion 
of natives of certain countries, such as China and Vietnam, from participating in the DV 
lottery as discriminatory, believing that it is based solely on their ethnicity.149 He argues 
that criteria used to exclude certain countries, because they have sent more than 50,000 
immigrants in the past five years, is arbitrary.150 According to Ting, the diversity visas are 
anti-diversity because “they were created to offset the diversity which would otherwise 
result from nondiscriminatory immigration.”151 He argues for changing the DV program 
to an immigration lottery “open equally to natives of every country and region of the 
world.”152 All in all, critics contend that the DV program has a number of shortcomings, 
as it accepts low-skilled individuals with no U.S. familial ties ahead of more deserving 
immigrants, strains U.S. administrative and financial resources, and discriminates against 
certain ethnic groups.  
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C. COUNTERARGUMENTS TO CRITICAL VIEWS OF THE DV 
PROGRAM AND DISCUSSED NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES  
National security concerns exist within every immigration program. The DV 
program is no more susceptible to fraud and national security concerns than any other 
program. Experts indicate that the fraud and national security concerns presented by the 
DV program exist in other programs as well, such as the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and 
tourist visa programs, and adequate measures can be implemented to address those 
concerns, rather than do away with the DV program.153 The program already employs 
extensive national security vetting measures and addresses fraud concerns. In fact, “over 
the lifetime of this program, the Bureau of Consular Affairs used post feedback to introduce 
screening, interviewing and training improvements promptly as trends and technology 
became available.”154  
It is true that the DV program approves individuals from countries designated by 
the DOS as state sponsors of terrorism. However, in 2007, the GAO study concluded, “We 
found no documented evidence that DV immigrants from these [state sponsors of 
terrorism], or other, countries posed a terrorist or other threat.”155 Moreover, individuals 
coming from such states are not restricted from applying through other legal permanent 
resident channels of immigration or categories, such as family reunification or 
employment-based immigration.156 Far more immigrants become legal permanent 
residents in the United States through other immigration categories rather than through the 
diversity visa.157 In 2017, only 4.6 percent of immigrants to the United States became LPRs 
through the diversity visa while over 66.4 percent became LPRs as family-sponsored 
immigrants, 12.2 percent through employment-based preferences, and 13 percent as 
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refugees and asylees.158 Also, as mentioned earlier, individuals from these designated 
countries can even enter the United States as tourists once it is determined they do not pose 
a threat to the U.S. public safety and national security.  
According to a joint DHS and Department of Justice (DOJ) report, “Three in four 
individuals convicted of international terrorism-related charges since September 11, 2001, 
were foreign-born.”159 According to the report, “549 individuals were convicted of 
international terrorism-related changes in U.S. federal courts between September 11, 2001, 
and December 31, 2016.”160 Out of 549, “254 were not U.S. citizens; 148 were foreign-
born, naturalized and received U.S. citizenship; and 147 were U.S. citizens by birth.”161 
Between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2015, approximately 750,000 individuals 
received their permanent residence through the DV program. However, only 402 foreign-
born individuals were convicted of terrorism during the same period of time, and the White 
House was able to list only seven individuals out of those 402 who entered through the DV 
program.  
Moreover, out of seven individuals listed by the White House as terrorists who 
entered through the DV program, three came to the United States as children and became 
radicalized in the United States: Imran Mandhai, Ali Shukri Amin, and Syed Haris 
Ahmed.162 Mandhai entered the United States from Pakistan at the age of 15, as a derivative 
on his parents’ DV application.163 In 2002, he pleaded guilty “to conspiring to bomb a 
National Guard Armory and electrical power substations near Miami.”164 Mandhai appears 
to have become radicalized while in the United States, as “the local police and other law 
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enforcement officials said Mr. Mandhai became disenchanted with American life and was 
attracted to militant Islamic politics soon after he arrived in the United States in April 
1998.”165 Amin entered the United States in 1999 from Sudan, as a derivative on the DV 
application of one of his parents.166 At the time, Amin was around two years old.167 He 
pleaded guilty to providing material support to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
and radicalized in the United States using the Internet and social media.168 Ahmed also 
entered the United States as a child on a DV application.169 At the time of his conviction 
in 2009, for conspiring to provide material support to terrorists, he was 25 years old, and 
he entered the United States in mid-90s.170 He also became radicalized through online 
forums.171 According to the DOJ, “At trial, the government presented evidence 
that…Ahmed…and [his] co-conspirator used the Internet to develop relationships and 
maintain contact…with other supporters of violent jihad in the United States, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Pakistan, and elsewhere.”172  
Two other individuals the White House lists as examples of terrorists who became 
permanent legal residents in the United States through the immigration lottery programs, 
Hesham Mohamed Ali Hedayet and Mousa Mohamed Abu Marzook, came to the United 
States prior to 9/11.173 Hedayet, a native of Egypt, arrived in the United States in 1992 and 
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received his LPR status through his wife, who “won” the DV program in 1997.174 Hedayet 
fatally shot two people and wounded three others at the Los Angeles International Airport 
in 2002.175 Marzook, a Hamas leader, arrived in the United States in the 1980s and received 
his LPR status in 1990 through a “predecessor program to the visa lottery.”176 Marzook 
has not been convicted in the United States, as he was deported to Jordan in 1997.177 
However, Marzook has been indicted by the United States in 2004 on racketeering 
charges.178 These individuals came to the United States in the 1990s, prior to the events of 
9/11 “when there was far less attention to the threat posed by jihadist terrorism.”179 The 
vetting process was not as advanced prior to 9/11, and thus failed to identify these 
individuals as national security threats.  
As mentioned earlier, Saipov also traveled to the United States through the DV 
program.180 However, he appears to have been radicalized in the United States.181 
According to Governor of New York, Andrew Cuomo, Saipov was radicalized 
domestically.182 Another Uzbekistan national listed as an example by the White House, 
Abdurasaul Hasanovich Juraboev, received his diversity visa in 2011, and “pleaded guilty 
to conspiring to support ISIS.”183 It appears that Juraboev may have also been radicalized 
online in the United States, as he “spent endless hours online…and became enamored of 
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the Islamic State, according to the government.”184 A vetting process would not have 
detected these individuals as threats to national security, because they were radicalized in 
the United States rather than in their home countries.  
Immigration experts argue that the concerns regarding low-skilled individuals 
entering the United States through the DV program are not entirely well-founded. Indeed, 
according to the Migration Policy Institute, in 2016, 50 percent of the DV immigrants had 
a college degree or higher, compared to 32 percent of the U.S. population as a whole.185 
Additionally, according to a study published in 2012 in the International Migration journal, 
only certain Africans, such as those in professional occupations, are likely to be able to 
participate in the DV program after a lottery win, as the process of turning a win into an 
actual DV can be too expensive for high school graduates.186 Moreover, DV immigrants 
were more likely to report having managerial and professional positions as opposed to 
LPRs in general. In fiscal year 2018, approximately 23 percent of DV applicants reported 
holding managerial and professional occupations versus 10 percent of the 1,096,611 
LPRs.187 Finally, in 2018, the unemployment rate for the DV immigrants was 3.8 percent, 
only 0.3 points higher than the unemployment rate for all foreign-born persons in the 
United States.188 Thus, characterizing DV immigrants as low-skilled is inaccurate, as they 
appear to be highly employable, with at least half having college degrees and almost a 
quarter holding professional positions.  
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Similarly, the argument that the DV immigration program is financially 
burdensome does not appear substantiated. Although $840,000 in program costs were not 
covered by the fees in fiscal year 2002, in March 2005, the DOS was able to raise the 
processing fee for DV winners from $100 to $375 to cover all program costs.189 
Additionally, considering that the DOS total budget request for fiscal year 2002 was $8.2 
billion, it is arguable that $840,000 costs of the DV program presented a considerable 
financial burden.190  
Also, immigration analysts explain that the DV program serves an important 
purpose in enhancing the United States’ diversity. Ting’s argument that the diversity visa 
purposely excludes and discriminates against Asian immigrants does not appear to be 
supported by evidence. He bases his argument on the fact that historically the United  
States engaged in exclusionary policies against Asian immigrants (i.e., Chinese Exclusion 
Act). However, diversity does not come at the expense of other ethnic groups, including 
Asian immigrants, because they are already immigrating to the United States in large 
numbers through other immigration avenues, such as family-based, employment-based,  
or humanitarian.  
The DV program promotes diversity and does not discriminate by providing 
opportunities to natives of countries who are not immigrating in large numbers through 
employment or family-based immigration. Consequently, the DV program has created an 
immigration avenue for the nationals of African, Eastern European, and former Soviet 
Union countries.191 In terms of African countries, Andowah A. Newton contends that the 
DV program “extends new immigration opportunities to Africans who have been 
disproportionately excluded from and underrepresented in the immigration system, and 
thereby slightly reduces the gross underrepresentation of Africans in the immigration 
system.”192 Thus, in fiscal year 2017, 19,211 persons from Africa obtained LPR status 
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through the DV program.193 Moreover, the DV program helped diversify the U.S. 
population by allowing many natives of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to 
immigrate to the United States, who were not able to immigrate freely to the United States 
during the Cold War.194 For instance, in fiscal year 2017, 4,721 persons from Eastern 
Europe and 12,805 from the former Soviet Union obtained LPR status through the DV 
program.195 In sum, the DV program honors the U.S. tradition of accepting enterprising 
immigrants striving to better their lives, and who, in turn, enrich and diversify the United 
States culturally and economically.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Although the DV program presents certain national security and other concerns, the 
program should not be eliminated, but the concerns of critics should be addressed. Even if 
the program accepts applicants from countries considered state sponsors of terrorism, it 
does not accept a greater number of immigrants from those countries than other 
immigration programs. Although the program has accepted individuals who later engaged 
or conspired to engage in terrorist acts, these individuals were radicalized in the United 
States. Furthermore, the program adds significant value to U.S. society by diversifying its 
population with natives of countries who have not immigrated to the United States 
extensively. Nonetheless, the program could benefit from further improvements, and the 
United States needs to identify and implement ways to minimize the potential threats posed 
by the program and to reap more benefits from the program. 
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III. FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRATION 
An ongoing debate has arisen about reforming the U.S. immigration system even 
at the highest levels of government. On September 17, 2017, President Donald Trump 
tweeted, “CHAIN MIGRATION cannot be part of any legislation on Immigration!”196 The 
White House and DHS argue that the majority of immigrants enter the United States as 
LPRs based on their familial ties rather than the skills they bring to the U.S. economy. They 
go on to assert family-based immigration undermines national security. The question is 
how much of a threat to national security and economic security family-based immigration 
presents. This chapter discusses the U.S. family-based immigration program. First, it 
provides an overview of the legal framework for family-based immigration, including  
its history, current state, eligibility criteria, and vetting process. Second, it addresses 
national security and economic challenges facing the family-based immigrant program. 
Third, it presents counterarguments to criticisms and described challenges of the family-
based program. 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FAMILY-BASED 
IMMIGRATION  
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was the first law to institute family 
reunification.197 Although the Act of 1952, also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, did 
not abolish the national origins quota, it created a system of preferences for family 
reunification.198 The Act’s four-preference system prioritized employment-based 
immigrants with high education or exceptional abilities followed by family-based 
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immigrants.199 In terms of family reunification, the system prioritized spouses and minor 
children over other relatives, as well as relatives of U.S. citizens over relatives of LPRs.200  
The INA of 1965, also known as the Hart-Celler Act, abolished the national origins 
quota system.201 Additionally, the INA of 1965 changed the aforementioned four-
preference system to a seven-preference system for family and employment-based 
immigrants. In the seven-preference system, the priority shifted from employment-based 
immigrants to family reunification.202 As such, the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens—
spouses, minor children, and parents—were no longer subject to numerical quotas or 
restrictions.203 For relatives subject to numerical limitations, first preference was granted 
to unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens, and the second preference to spouses and 
unmarried children of LPRs.204 The fourth and fifth preferences were given to other 
relatives, married children of U.S. citizens and siblings of U.S. citizens over 21 years of 
age.205 The third and sixth preferences were reserved for employment-based immigrants.206 
Moreover, by amending the national origins quota, the INA of 1965 restricted immigration 
from the Eastern Hemisphere, as a way of immigration control, to an annual limit of 20,000 
immigrants per country, with an overall annual limit of 170,000 based on the 
aforementioned seven-preference categories.207 Similarly, effective July 1, 1968, the law 
limited immigration from the Western Hemisphere to 120,000 annually, without per-
country ceilings or seven-preference categories.208 
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The Immigration Act of 1990 raised the overall numerical limitation on 
immigration to 700,000 per year for three years, and subsequently, to 675,000 per year.209 
As a result, the statutory limit of family-based immigration was raised from an initial 
annual limit of 290,000 to 480,000 per year for two years and then to 465,000 per year.210 
Although the Act of 1990 raised the annual cap on family-based immigration, ostensibly 
reinforcing the commitment of U.S. immigration policy to family unity, it did not 
significantly increase the total number of family-sponsored immigrants.211 The reason for 
this lack of significant increase is that immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, still not subject 
to caps, were now subtracted from the total allocation of family-sponsored immigrants.212 
However, the Act of 1990 ensured admission for at least 226,000 other relatives of U.S. 
citizens and LPRs.213 In sum, family-based immigration was initially introduced by the 
INA of 1952, prioritized by the INA of 1965, and further reinforced by the Immigration 
Act of 1990. The next section provides additional details on the current legal immigration 
limits of family-based immigration and preference categories.  
1. The Current State of Family-Based Immigration  
Family-based immigration is divided into two major categories.214 The first 
category consists of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, spouses, minor unmarried 
children, and parents of adult U.S. citizens.215 This category is not subject to numerical 
limitations, and in fiscal year 2017, 516,508 immediate relatives of U.S. citizens were 
granted LPR status while in fiscal year 2018, 478,961 immediate relatives became LPRs.216 
The second category includes other relatives of U.S. citizens and LPRs, consisting of four 
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preference categories—unmarried children of U.S. citizens, spouses and minor children of 
LPRs, unmarried children of LPRs, and married children of U.S. citizens—numerically 
limited to 226,000 annually.217 The breakdown of the four-preference categories, including 
the types of relatives and their respective allowed numbers per year, is displayed in  
Table 1.218  
Table 1. Numerically Limited Family Preference Categories.219 
Family Preference 
Categories 
Family Members Numbers 
First Preference Unmarried children of U.S. 
citizens plus unused visas 
from the Fourth Preference 
23,400 
Second Preference (A) Spouses and minor 
children of LPRs  
87,900 
Second Preference (B) Unmarried children of 
LPRs plus unused visas 
from the First Preference 
26,300 
Third Preference Married children of U.S. 
citizens plus unused visas 
from the First and Second 
Preferences 
23,400 
Fourth Preference  Siblings of adult U.S. 
citizens plus unused visas 
from First, Second, and 




In addition to the aforementioned numerical caps, the INA also sets an annual seven 
percent limit per country of the total family-based and employment-based preference 
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visas.220 Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are exempt from the seven percent cap.221 
Due to country limitations, the wait times for family-based visas can be extensive, 
especially for countries with many family-sponsored immigrants, such as India, China, 
Mexico, and the Philippines.222  
2. Eligibility Criteria  
Obtaining permanent residence based on a family relationship is a two-step process. 
First, a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident must petition on behalf of a prospective 
immigrant by filing Form I-130, the Petition for Alien Relative, with USCIS. Form I-130 
is used for immediate relatives, as well as those in preference categories.223 It initiates the 
process of establishing the legitimacy of the claimed relationship.224 The filing of the 
petition or its approval does not grant benefits to a prospective immigrant, but “serves only 
to present for review the legal and factual validity of the claimed relationship.”225  
Second, once the I-130 petition is approved, the prospective immigrant can file an 
application to obtain legal permanent residence, Form I-485, the Application to Register 
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status.226 For immediate relatives, the I-130 petition and 
I-485 application can be filed concurrently.227 Eligible relatives in the four-preference 
categories must wait for a visa number to become available, unless it is immediately 
available, before filing the I-485 application.228 When the number of petitions exceeds the 
annual visas available, a “visa queue” is created, which is “not a backlog of petitions to be 
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processed but, rather, the number of persons approved for visas that are not yet available 
due to the numerical limits enumerated in the INA.”229  
The DOS is responsible for allocating visas.230 Visas are allocated based on a 
prospective immigrant’s preference category, country of chargeability–which is usually the 
country of birth–and priority date.231 The priority date for family-based immigrants is the 
date the I-130 was properly filed, and it determines the prospective immigrant’s place in 
the visa queue.232 Once the priority date becomes available or current, immigrants may file 
the I-485 application.233 The DOS publishes a Visa Bulletin on a monthly basis, where 
someone can determine whether a visa is available based on the family preference category, 
country of birth, and priority date.234 
For immigrants residing in the United States legally, the two-step process is handled 
by the USCIS.235 For those immigrants who are overseas, the USCIS reviews and 
adjudicates Form I-130, while the DOS is responsible for adjudicating Form I-485.236 As 
mentioned previously, in both cases, if the I-130 form is approved, the DOS determines 
visa availability for the four-preference categories.237  
The I-130 petition involves completing an application, which asks for the 
petitioner’s and beneficiary’s biographic information, address history, employment 
history, marital history, and other information.238 In addition, the form requires proof of 
identity for both the petitioner and beneficiary, as well as proof of the claimed 
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relationship.239 The required evidence of the relationship depends on the nature of the 
claimed relationship.240 For instance, spousal petitions require proof that any prior 
marriages have been terminated.241  
If the I-130 petition is approved, the petitioner’s responsibilities do not end. Once 
family-sponsored immigrants apply for adjustment of status, they are required to submit an 
affidavit of support, signed by the petitioner or sponsor to ensure that they will not become 
public charges once in the United States.242 By signing Form I-864, the Affidavit of 
Support, the petitioner agrees to support the immigrant financially for 10 years, or until the 
immigrant becomes a naturalized citizen.243 The petitioner or sponsor must reside in the 
United States and meet a minimum income level per Federal Poverty Guidelines.244 If the 
petitioner’s income does not meet the Federal Poverty Guidelines, a proof of value of assets 
can be submitted to make up the difference.245 Additionally, if the petitioner’s income is 
insufficient, it is necessary to find a co-sponsor with adequate income.246 Finally, in 
addition to the aforementioned requirements, a beneficiary has to be vetted to determine 
eligibility and admissibility, as discussed in the following section.  
3. Vetting Process  
The USCIS screens every immigrant and nonimmigrant benefit application to 
determine an applicant’s eligibility or admissibility. Consequently, USCIS conducts 
background checks to check potential LPRs for national security and public safety 
 
239 Lichter, “The Nuts and Bolts of Family-Based Immigration (Part 1),” 42. 
240 Lichter, 42. 
241 Laura L. Lichter, “The Nuts and Bolts of Family-Based Immigration (Part 2),” Practical Lawyer; 
Philadelphia 53, no. 1 (February 2007): 39–51. 
242 Lichter, 49. 
243 Lichter, 49. 
244 “I-864 Affidavit of Support (FAQs),” U.S. Department of State—Bureau of Consular Affairs, 
accessed July 25, 2020, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/the-immigrant-visa-
process/step-1-submit-a-petition/i-864-affidavit-faqs.html#aos7. 
245 U.S. Department of State—Bureau of Consular Affairs. 
246 Weissbrodt and Danielson, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell, 141–142; U.S. 
Department of State—Bureau of Consular Affairs. 
42 
concerns.247 The USCIS runs an alien’s name in TECS, formerly known as the Treasury 
Enforcement Communication System, which includes information from the Terrorist 
Screening Center’s (TSC) watch list of known or suspected terrorists (KSTs).248 
Additionally, the USCIS conducts fingerprint checks, which are reviewed by the FBI to 
determine whether an applicant has a criminal record, which may lead to being ineligible 
for the LPR status.249 Per the USCIS’s request, the FBI also conducts an applicant’s name 
check against its databases to detect any national security or public safety investigations 
concerning the applicant.250 If any of the aforementioned checks present a potential 
national security concern, then the USCIS withholds adjudication until the concern is 
resolved with the relevant law enforcement or intelligence agency.251  
Moreover, I-130 petitions and I-485 applications suspected of fraud are referred to 
the USCIS Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) Directorate for an 
investigation.252 FDNS officers are located in every USCIS service center, field office, and 
asylum office.253 At the completion of the investigation, FDNS officers return the results 
of the investigation to adjudicators.254 The results of the investigation are summarized in a 
statement of findings (SOF), as either fraud found, fraud not found, or inconclusive.255 The 
adjudicators consider the SOF when rendering a decision on the application.256 
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For the immigrants located overseas, DOS consular officers conduct interviews on 
approved I-130 petitions to determine the applicant’s eligibility for legal permanent 
residency.257 The petitions suspected or confirmed to be fraudulent are returned to a USCIS 
service center, which adjudicated them, and subsequently, are referred to FDNS.258 
Ultimately, the USCIS decides whether to reaffirm or revoke petitions suspected of 
fraud.259 If a petition is reaffirmed, the USCIS returns the petition to the DOS with an 
explanation.260 If a petition is revoked, then the DOS is no longer authorized to issue a 
visa.261  
In addition to conducting background checks, the USCIS must also determine that 
the applicant is not inadmissible on health-related grounds.262 Thus, applicants, who are in 
the United States, are required to be medically examined by a USCIS-designated civil 
surgeon in the United States.263 The civil surgeon records the examination results on Form 
I-693, the Report of Medical Examination and Vaccination Record, which is reviewed by 
an adjudicator for proper completion, validity, and health-related admissibility.264 
Moreover, the USCIS interviews applicants for adjustment of status. Through in-
person interviews, the USCIS verifies information on the application, allows applicants to 
make changes to the application, and resolves incomplete answers or unanswered 
questions.265 The interview enables the USCIS to determine the applicant’s eligibility.266 
For family-based applications, the USCIS requires the I-130 petitioner to appear at the 
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interview with the adjustment of status applicant.267 The USCIS waives interviews for 
certain adjustment of status applicants.268 For instance, the USCIS may waive interviews 
for parents of U.S. citizens or clearly ineligible applicants.269 All in all, applications  
are reviewed for fraud, and applicants are interviewed to determine their eligibility  
and undergo background checks for national security, public safety, and health-related 
concerns.  
B. NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES  
Critics characterize family-based immigration as “chain migration,” which is 
defined as “the process by which foreign nationals permanently resettle within the U.S. and 
subsequently bring over their foreign relatives, who in turn petition to bring over their 
relatives, until entire extended families are resettled within the country.”270 Ultimately, 
chain migration can lead to a considerably high number of immigrants in the United States 
having an extremely attenuated connection to the original immigrant.271 The following 
example illustrates the concept:  
Assume one foreign-born married couple, both naturalized, each with two 
siblings who are also married and each new nuclear family having three 
children. The foreign-born married couple may petition for the admission 
of their siblings. Each has a spouse and three children who come with their 
parents. Each spouse is a potential source for more immigration, and so it 
goes. It is possible that no less than 84 persons would become eligible for 
visas in a relatively short period of time.272  
Critics contend that chain migration jeopardizes national security. According to the 
White House, it “undermines national security, by failing to establish merit-based criteria 
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for evaluating entrants into the United States…[such as] their likelihood of assimilation 
into our society.”273 Most importantly, chain migration allows terrorists to enter the United 
States based on their attenuated familial ties.274 The White House identifies eight 
immigrants who entered the United States through the family-based program and have 
committed or attempted to commit terrorist acts.275 One of the eight individuals is Akayed 
Ullah, a national of Bangladesh, who entered the United States with his parents in 2011, at 
the age of 21, as a child of a sibling of a U.S. citizen. In December 2017, Ullah detonated 
a bomb near the New York Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York City. Ullah was 
seriously injured in the blast, and at least one bystander was wounded with shrapnel.276 
According to the police, during an interrogation, Ullah indicated that he had committed the 
act for ISIS.277  
Critics also emphasize that chain migration negatively affects the U.S. economy 
because it does not promote economic growth. As such, family-based immigration brings 
individuals because of family ties rather than their ability to contribute to the U.S. 
economy. According to the DHS, family-based immigration causes legal low-skilled 
migration, and in turn, lowers wages and job opportunities for low-skilled U.S. workers, 
with especially negative effects on African-American and Hispanic workers.278 The reason 
for these lower wages and reduced job opportunities is competition between low-skilled 
family-based immigrants and low-skilled U.S. natives for the same jobs.  
Moreover, low-skilled immigrants admitted through family-based immigration are 
less educated and have higher unemployment rates.279 Meanwhile, higher-skilled 
immigrants are more likely to be better educated, earn higher salaries, and pay higher taxes 
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than low-skilled immigrants.280 Therefore, higher-skilled immigrants are more likely to 
contribute to the country’s economic growth by adding more to tax revenues.281 
Additionally, they are less likely to rely on government taxpayer-funded assistance than 
low-skilled immigrants, and detract from tax revenues.282 For example, according to David 
C. Koelsch, “A computer programmer with an advanced degree earns five times what a 
cashier at Dunkin’ Donuts earns, and is thus less likely to require government assistance to 
make ends meet. The computer programmer also pays nearly eight times in taxes what the 
cashier pays.”283 In sum, critics characterize family-based immigration as chain migration, 
arguing it undermines national security by allowing terrorists into the country and 
diminishes economic growth by admitting low-skilled immigrants.  
C. COUNTERARGUMENTS TO CRITICAL VIEWS OF FAMILY-BASED 
IMMIGRATION AND DISCUSSED NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES  
Family-based immigration is no more susceptible to national security concerns than 
any other program. As discussed earlier, family-based immigration already employs 
extensive national security vetting measures. Out of literally millions of family-based 
immigrants admitted to the United States, the White House identified only eight who were 
accused or convicted of terrorist activities. According to the CATO Institute, “From 1975 
through 2015, 54 foreign-born terrorists were LPRs—an average of 1.32 terrorists per year. 
Over the 41-year period, more than 35 million LPRs were allowed in, meaning that just 
0.00016 percent of LPRs were actual terrorists. In other words, one terrorist entered for 
every 644,990 nonterrorist legal permanent residents.”284 The figures of the CATO 
Institute include LPRs from all immigrant categories, not just family-based immigrants.285  
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Significantly, out of the eight individuals listed by the White House, two appear to 
have been radicalized after they were admitted to the United States. Two came to the 
United States as children—Zoobia Shahnaz and Mohamad Saeed Kodaimati—and became 
radicalized later.286 Shahnaz immigrated from Pakistan in 2000, at the age of 10, with her 
parents, and was admitted to the United States as a child of a U.S. citizen sibling.287 On 
November 26, 2018, Shahnaz, at the time a 27-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen, pleaded 
guilty to providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, ISIS.288 In 2016, she 
volunteered with the Syrian American Medical Society and provided medical assistance to 
Syrian refugees in the Zataari Refugee Camp in Jordan, where ISIS was influential at the 
time.289 According to a letter by her attorneys, “This experience was the gateway factor 
that led to her decision to join ISIS.”290  
Similarly, Kodaimati, a national of Syria, immigrated to the United States in 2001, 
when he was approximately 10 years old, as a family member of an LPR.291 He became a 
naturalized citizen in 2008. It appears that Kodaimati was radicalized in or after 2012, when 
he traveled from the United States to Istanbul, Turkey and spent time in Syria and Turkey 
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until his return to the United States in March 2015.292 Kodaimaiti pleaded guilty in October 
2015 for making false statements to FBI and DOS agents regarding his involvement in 
international terrorism.293 These individuals thus were radicalized after they were admitted 
as LPRs rather than before. In any event, the current vetting process would not have 
detected these two individuals as threats to national security, even if they were radicalized 
prior to entering the United States, because they entered as children at the age of 10, and 
immigration background checks are conducted on applicants over the age of 14.294  
Three other individuals the White House lists as examples of terrorists became 
permanent legal residents in the United States through family-based immigration prior to 
the events of 9/11: Uzair Paracha, Mufid Elfghee, and Khaleel Ahmed.295 As explained in 
the previous chapter, the national security vetting of prospective immigrants prior to the 
events of 9/11, “when there was far less attention to the threat posed by jihadist terrorism,” 
was not as thorough as it is today.296 Paracha, a Pakistani national, was admitted to the 
United States in 1980, as a family member of an LPR, and in 2003, provided material 
support to al Qaeda.297 Paracha was admitted as an LPR prior to his first birthday and 
“shuttled between Karachi and New York.”298 Elfghee, a national of Yemen, was admitted 
to the United States in 1997, at the age of 13, as a family member of a naturalized U.S. 
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citizen.299 From December 2013 through May 2014, Elfghee was attempting to recruit two 
individuals to travel to Syria to fight on behalf of ISIS.300 Ahmed, a national of India, 
entered the United States in 1998 as a family member of a naturalized U.S. citizen.301 He 
conspired to provide material support to terrorists, beginning in 2004 until his arrest in 
2007.302 In addition, to less stringent vetting prior to 9/11, Paracha and Elfghee were under 
the age of 14 when they were admitted as LPRs and would not have undergone background 
checks. Additionally, in March 2020, charges against Paracha were dropped, in exchange 
for his agreement to abandon his LPR status and voluntarily depart the United States.303 
Moreover, according to federal prosecutors, Ahmed, who entered the United States at 17 
years of age, radicalized while living in the United States.304  
As mentioned earlier, Ullah also entered the United States through family-based 
immigration. Ullah appears to also have been radicalized in the United States. According 
to the DOJ:  
Ullah’s radicalization began no later than approximately 2014. Ullah 
viewed pro-ISIS materials online, including a video instructing, in 
substance, that if supporters of ISIS were unable to travel overseas to join 
ISIS, they should carry out attacks in their homelands. He began researching 
how to build IEDs [improvised explosive devices] on the Internet 
approximately one year prior to the attack.305  
Similarly, another individual, Mahmoud Amin Mohamed Elhassan, may have been 
radicalized in the United States. Elhassan, a Sudanese national, was admitted to the United 
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States in 2012, as a family member of an LPR.306 He attempted to provide material support 
to ISIS by trying to join the terrorist organization and lied to the FBI.307 It is unclear when 
Elhassan became radicalized, but it is possible that his radicalization took place in the 
United States. According to his sentencing memorandum, “The defendant was radicalized 
towards violent jihad either before he arrived in the United States or shortly after arriving 
in the United States.”308 A vetting process would not have detected these individuals as 
threats to national security, because they appear to have been radicalized in the United 
States, rather than in their home countries.  
One of the individuals listed by the White House, Ahmed Amin El-Mofty, does not 
seem to have been inspired by international terrorist groups. It is unclear how or when El-
Mofty entered the United States. According to the White House, “an Egyptian national, 
entered the United States through a distant relative (chain migration) and became a United 
States citizen after arriving.”309 On December 22, 2017, El-Mofty opened fire on police 
officers in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and was killed in the process.310 Although the White 
House categorized El-Mofty’s acts as terrorism, no evidence tied him to terrorist groups.311 
El-Mofty’s family members indicated that he was depressed due to personal problems, 
including money issues and the lack of contact with his family.312 In sum, out of millions 
of family-based immigrants, the White House was able to identify eight individuals who 
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have committed terrorist acts, but the evidence suggests most, if not all, of these individuals 
were radicalized after they had been admitted into the United States as LPRs.  
The proponents of family-based immigration decry the term chain migration and 
argue that the reality is far different from the negative narrative. In reality, family-based 
visas are available only to a limited number of close relatives, many of whom have to wait 
for years or decades to be reunited due to the visa queue.313 The following illustrative 
example is used to debunk the myth of chain migration:  
In 2007, an immigrant who arrived 6 years before and has now become a 
U.S. citizen decides to sponsor a sibling for immigration. With an 11-year 
wait (or 12 to 20 years for certain countries), that means 17 years would 
pass between the arrival of the first and second immigrant. If the second 
immigrant takes 6 years to become a citizen and then sponsors an unmarried 
adult child, it would take an additional 6 to 15 years for that immigrant to 
arrive…the time between the arrival of the first immigrant and the third 
immigrant would be between 29 and 47 years, depending on the country of 
origin.314  
Furthermore, according to the CATO Institute, many family-based immigrants are 
educated.315 For instance, approximately half of family-based immigrants who arrived in 
2015 were college educated.316 In addition, “family-sponsored immigrants were 62 percent 
more likely than U.S.-born natives to have graduated college. At the same time, they are 
no more likely to have dropped out of high school than natives.”317 
Additionally, although in fiscal year 2018—the most recent year these statistics 
were available—family-based immigrants reported a 12 percent unemployment rate and 
only 6.36 percent of family-based immigrants reported holding managerial and 
professional occupations, family-based immigrants are more likely to invest in human 
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capital, which then leads to a better economy.318 Thus, family-based immigrants pursue 
academic and vocational training, which is evidenced by the fact that their initial earnings 
are low but their earnings growth is high.319 The immigrants’ investment into human 
capital does not only benefit them but also the U.S. economy.320 When the economic 
demand shifts requiring new skills, family-based immigrants will be more likely to pursue 
the new opportunities than high-skilled immigrants or natives.321 Family-based immigrants 
are more adaptable to the changing skills needs of the U.S. economy, thus adding more 
flexibility to it.322  
Along the same lines, family-based immigrants also play an important role in 
innovation. Family-based immigrants’ lack of transferable skills and their willingness and 
ability to gain new skills may lead to new businesses or “new directions in existing 
businesses.”323 Thus, “an entrepreneur in an area or time period with such immigrants will 
have a relative advantage in launching an innovation.”324 Additionally, family-based 
immigrants are likely to become entrepreneurs themselves, and thus, contribute to the U.S. 
economic growth through job creation for U.S. workers.325  
Furthermore, as the United States lacks dedicated immigrant integration services, 
family-based immigrants receive integration support from their relatives in the United 
States, in terms of housing, transportation, and other important services.326 U.S. family 
members and ethnic enclaves also assist family-based immigrants with finding 
employment opportunities or becoming entrepreneurs.327 Thus, U.S.-based relatives help 
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family-based immigrants assimilate economically.328 Overall, family-based immigrants 
contribute to the economic growth through investing in human capital, innovation, and 
entrepreneurship, as well as aiding in immigrants’ economic assimilation.  
D. CONCLUSION  
Critics argue family-based immigration poses national security and economic 
threats to the United States. Although the family-based immigration program has accepted 
individuals who later engaged in terrorism, most of these individuals were radicalized after 
being admitted to the United States and the threat to national security has been exaggerated. 
Moreover, critics of family-based immigration argue that family-based immigrants are low 
skilled and less educated, and thus, do not contribute significantly to the U.S. economic 
growth. However, the critics fail to recognize that family-based immigrants are more likely 
to invest in human capital, become entrepreneurs, and play an important role in innovation, 
which greatly adds to the country’s economic growth. Nonetheless, family-based 
immigration could be improved, and the United States could identify additional ways to 
derive economic benefits from the program.  
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IV. CANADIAN AND AUSTRALIAN MERIT-BASED 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEMS 
The United States could learn how a merit-based system succeeds or fails in 
practice by exploring and analyzing the Canadian and Australian immigration systems. 
Australia and Canada lend themselves well to the comparison for a variety of reasons. Like 
the United States, both countries are advanced industrialized democracies. As in the United 
States, immigration has been historically significant in Canada and Australia.329 Moreover, 
Australia and Canada were two of the first countries to adopt merit-based immigration 
systems.330 Additionally, over time, Australia changed its immigration system from 
primarily family-based to merit-based, which is what is being proposed by the RAISE Act 
when it comes to the U.S. immigration system.331 This chapter provides an overview of 
Canadian and Australian immigration systems. First, it discusses the Canadian immigration 
system, including its points-based system, family-based immigration, the system’s 
drawbacks and advantages, and national security vetting and concerns. Second, it addresses 
the Australian immigration system in the same manner. 
A. CANADA 
Immigration to Canada is facilitated by Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship 
Canada (IRCC), and is primarily regulated by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
of 2001 (IRPA).332 In 1967, Canada introduced the world’s first merit-based immigration 
system, which involved assigning points to skilled applicants based on various criteria.333 
Canada implemented the new system to shift the selection focus away from national 
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origin.334 Since its inception, Canada’s points-based system has changed in terms of how 
points are assigned, with the latest significant change being the introduction of the Express 
Entry system in 2015.335  
As in the United States, Canada allocates permanent residence visas to three broad 
categories of immigrants: economic, family, and humanitarian.336 Family and humanitarian 
groups of immigrants are not assessed based on points, while specific subcategories of the 
economic immigrants are assigned points to determine their eligibility and admission.337 
The three economic points-based immigration programs are the Federal Skilled Worker 
Program, Federal Skilled Trades Program, and Canadian Experience Class.338  
1. Canadian Points-Based and Family-Based Immigration  
The points-based process is managed by the Express Entry system, an online two-
step process, which was introduced in 2015.339 First, potential immigrants submit an initial 
application wherein they express their interest in immigrating to Canada and complete an 
online profile, which includes personal details, passport or travel document information, 
language test results, education credentials, and if they have them, provincial nominations 
and pending job offers.340 Subsequently, their profiles are electronically screened to 
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determine if they are eligible for any of the aforementioned programs.341 Second, the 
applications of qualified individuals are placed into a candidate pool and are assigned a 
Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS) score.342  
The Federal Skilled Worker Program, however, which is a permanent immigration 
avenue for skilled workers with foreign work experience, has its own points-based system 
for eligibility determination.343 The points are assigned based on age, work experience, a 
valid job offer, language skills, education, and adaptability to Canada.344 Applicants to the 
Federal Skilled Worker Program need to obtain a minimum of 67 points out of 100, before 
being accepted into the Express Entry pool and assigned a CRS score.345 The maximum 
number of points for each qualification is displayed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Federal Skilled Worker Program Points per Qualification.346 
Qualifications Federal Skilled Worker Program 
Points 
Age 12 
Language Skills  28 
Work Experience 15 
Arranged Employment in Canada 10 





341 Government of Canada, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Express Entry Year-End 
Report 2018.” 
342 Government of Canada, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. 
343 Ahmad, “Points-Based and Family Immigration: Canada.” 
344 Ahmad. 
345 “Eligibility to Apply as a Federal Skilled Worker (Express Entry),” Government of Canada, 
Immigration and Citizenship, accessed May 10, 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/express-entry/eligibility/federal-skilled-workers.html#works.  
346 Adapted from “Six Selection Factors—Federal Skilled Worker Program (Express Entry),” 




The maximum CRS score that an applicant can receive is 1,200, with 600 points 
allocated to human capital skills, such as age, education, official language proficiency, and 
work experience.347 The other 600 points are distributed among factors, such as having a 
job offer, a sibling who is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident, or post-secondary 
education in Canada.348 Subsequently, eligible applicants are issued Invitations to Apply 
(ITA) for visas through bi-weekly invitation rounds.349 During every round, the Canadian 
government “specifies the number of invitations issued, the rank required to be invited to 
apply, and the CRS cut-off score (the score of the lowest-ranked candidate invited) for 
permanent residence.”350 
The aforementioned economic-based immigration programs, including the Federal 
Skilled Worker Program, allow candidates to include certain family members in the 
application.351 Upon approval of the application, family members included in the 
application become permanent residents.352 Specifically, as a principal applicant, the 
candidate can include dependents, such as a spouse or common law partner, dependent 
children under 22 years old, spouse’s or common-law partner’s dependent child, and a 
dependent child of a dependent child.353 The dependents must arrive with the principal 
applicants or after them but not before them.354 Additionally, many Canadian permanent 
residency programs, including the Federal Skilled Worker Program, require the principal 
applicant to demonstrate the ability to support his dependents financially.355 Parents, 
grandparents, siblings, uncles or aunts, nieces or nephews, and other relatives cannot be 
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included in the application.356 Nonetheless, once applicants immigrate to Canada, they may 
be able to sponsor the aforementioned relatives under the family sponsorship program.357  
The IRCC sets annual targets and ranges for total immigration and immigration by 
category.358 Thus, in 2020, Canada projects to admit 341,000 immigrants, in total.359 The 
family reunification range is projected to be from 84,500 to 96,000, and the range for 
federal economic, provincial, and territorial nominees is projected to increase from 161,000 
to 187,400.360 In sum, the Canadian economic-based immigration is a complex system that 
relies on points, administered through an online platform, Express Entry, to determine an 
applicant’s eligibility, and it allows candidates to include their immediate family members 
in the application.  
2. Drawbacks and Benefits of the Canadian Immigration System 
The Canadian merit-based system has several drawbacks. For instance, skilled 
immigrants who enter Canada struggle to obtain the necessary accreditation to work in 
Canada.361 Many skilled immigrants do not have job offers when they are granted 
permanent residence.362 In the first half of 2017, 90 percent of Express Entry candidates 
who received an ITA did not have a job offer.363 They face a highly competitive labor 
market, where their foreign credentials are not readily accepted.364 In Canada, provincial 
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requirements.365 Before being able to practice law, medicine, or other professions in a 
Canadian province, foreign-trained professionals may need to acquire additional training 
or pass examinations based on the determination and discretion of Canadian professional 
licensing organizations.366 Thus, skilled immigrants in Canada face underemployment.367 
For instance, in Canada, 60 percent of male skilled immigrants have jobs below their 
educational level.368 Further, employers in Canada may not value education or experience 
that the skilled immigrants obtained overseas, which results in even more 
underemployment.369 In sum, many immigrants to Canada fail to integrate due to their 
inability to find suitable professional employment.370  
Applicants are selected based on hard skills, such as education credentials and work 
experience, rather than soft skills, such as communication and leadership ability.371 Hard 
skills and soft skills are not always interconnected.372 As Daniel Hiebert noted, “The 
capacity to acquire knowledge is not necessarily the same as the ability to mobilize and 
transfer knowledge.”373 Points-based systems cannot necessarily account for soft skills, 
which employers want, in addition to hard skills.374 Employers are also likely looking for 
individuals who are “attuned to the cultural norms and expectations of local workplaces,” 
which cannot be measured by selection systems, such as Express Entry.375 
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Additionally, the Canadian points-based system presumes that the economy only 
desires highly skilled workers. However, Canada faces labor shortages in low-skilled and 
unskilled jobs.376 For instance, in some Canadian provinces, the labor shortages are 
particularly critical due to the aging workforce.377 Canada also has the Temporary Foreign 
Worker Program to recruit low-skilled workers to address market demands.378 However, 
employers contend that the program is “onerous and time-consuming” as “they must prove 
they have [first] offered the jobs to Canadians and there can be a considerable lag between 
the moment they need workers and when they actually arrive.”379 Thus, admitting 
immigrants just because of their high skills is problematic.380  
Notwithstanding these negatives, the Canadian merit-based immigration system 
also has positive aspects. In terms of benefits, Canada re-evaluates its immigration system 
every five years.381 Although these regular reviews of the Canadian immigration system 
may be costly, they are also beneficial. For instance, Canadian reforms in 2016 reduced the 
number of points potential immigrants can receive for having job offers, which led to less 
gender disparity and allowed some applicants to be selected who would not have otherwise 
been selected.382 The transparency of a points-based system is also beneficial. Potential 
immigrants can review the requirements and determine whether they can attain them.383 
The criteria are clear and objective and ensure “procedural certainty” for prospective 
immigrants.384  
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Merit-based immigration systems attract “better quality immigration candidates” 
and lead to better economic outcomes.385 High-skilled immigrants are more likely “to push 
outward the frontier of knowledge,” pay higher taxes, and receive fewer public services.386 
In Canada, “As of the 2016 Census, 4 in 10 immigrants aged 25 to 64 had a bachelor’s 
degree or higher. In comparison, just under one-quarter of the Canadian-born population 
aged 25 to 64 had a bachelor’s degree or higher…Recent immigrants were even more likely 
to have a master’s or doctorate degree, with 16.7% of them holding these graduate degrees 
in 2016.”387 Moreover, in 2017, the unemployment rate for immigrants, aged 25 to 54, in 
Canada went down to 6.4 percent, while the unemployment rate for Canadian-born 
individuals during the same year was five percent.388  
Another benefit of the Canadian merit-based immigration system is immigrant 
integration services available to economic and family class immigrants. Planning for 
Canada, (PFC), formerly known as the Canadian Immigrant Integration Program (CIIP), 
helps new immigrants in terms of preparing to move to Canada, obtaining employment, 
and settling in to their new home environment.389 The PFC program consists of three 
steps.390 The first step, group orientation (GO), is a day-long session that familiarizes 
newcomers with the Canadian system of government, culture, employment, housing, 
education, and other topics.391 The second step involves a 60- to 90-minute personalized 
session where a PFC facilitator assists newcomers with creating an action plan for 
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settlement and employment prior to their departure to Canada.392 The third step consists of 
linking newcomers to advisors from Canadian organizations, who provide further 
assistance by answering various questions regarding settlement, including employment and 
professional licensing requirements.393 The advisors’ role also includes providing career 
advice and employer referrals.394  
In terms of public opinion on immigration, according to the IRCC, in 2019, 
Canadians were overall pro-immigration when it came to economic classes of immigrants 
rather than refugee or family classes.395 They viewed immigration in terms of costs and 
benefits and were concerned about the integration of new immigrants.396 However, 
according to some news reports, public opinion in Canada is hardening when it comes to 
immigration, and it is becoming a polarizing topic.397 Recent polls indicate that Canadians 
view illegal immigration as a significant problem, and a shift against immigrants, including 
refugees, has occurred.398 Overall, Canada’s merit-based immigration system has certain 
detriments, such as underemployment and low-skilled labor shortages, but it also has 
advantages, including regular system re-evaluations, highly educated immigrants, and an 
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3. National Security and the Canadian Immigration System  
Canada employs immigration security vetting processes for public safety and 
national security concerns to screen individuals seeking to immigrate to Canada. The 
federal bodies, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), IRCC, and Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (CSIS), are responsible for administering background checks on 
individuals 18 years of age or older.399 The individuals must be in compliance with national 
security requirements detailed in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.400 The 
IRCC adjudicates applications for immigration benefits, such as permanent residence and 
citizenship, while the CSIS and CBSA advise the IRCC on whether the applicants present 
security concerns.401 The CBSA also works with foreign and Canadian law enforcement 
agencies, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).402 The Minister of 
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, previously Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration, issues danger opinions against potential immigrants, who are believed to be 
a national security or public safety threat to Canada.403 Danger opinions allow the CSBA 
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Despite its security vetting mechanisms, Canada has had a number of immigrants 
involved in terrorist or foreign fighter activities. Alex Wilner and Irfan Yar identified 95 
Canadians “who have, or are suspected of having, radicalized, mobilized, and/or 
participated in Islamist terrorist activity between 2006 and 2017.”405 Out of those 95 
individuals, 28 immigrated to Canada as minors.406 It can be assumed that those who 
immigrated as children and teenagers did so as family or humanitarian immigrants.  
B. AUSTRALIA  
Australia’s Immigration and Citizenship Program facilitates immigration to 
Australia under the auspices of the Department of Home Affairs, and is administered by 
the Migration Act of 1958 and Migration Regulations of 1994.407 Australia implemented 
its merit-based immigration system in 1979, and like Canada, Australia moved away from 
an immigration selection system based on an individual’s race.408  
Permanent immigration to Australia consists of two main components, the 
Migration Program and the Humanitarian Program.409 The Migration Program, which 
involves merit-based immigration, is further divided into three streams: a Skilled program, 
a Family program, and a Special Eligibility program.410 The points-based system applies 
to the Skilled program, which is divided into additional immigration streams and visa 
subclasses.411 The points-based visa subclasses of the Skilled program include the 
following: 
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• Business Innovation and Investment (Provisional) Visa (subclass 188);  
• Skilled Independent Visa (subclass 189);  
• Skilled Nominated Visa (subclass 190); and 
• Skilled Work Regional (Provisional) Visa (subclass 491).412  
1. Australian Points-Based and Family-Based Immigration  
Australia’s points-based process is similar to Canada’s. Instead of Canada’s 
Express Entry, Australia has SkillSelect, a system where applicants can complete an 
expression of interest (EOI) online.413 An EOI involves providing the following 
information: personal details, desired profession, education, employment experience, 
English language proficiency, and a skill assessment based on the desired occupation.414 
To be eligible to enter the EOI pool, an applicant must score 65 points.415 The maximum 
number of points per qualification for Subclass 189, 190, and 491 is displayed in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Points per Qualification for Subclass 189, 190, and 491.416 
Qualifications Maximum Points for Subclass 
189, 190, and 491 Visas 
Age 30 
English Language Ability 20 
Skilled Employment outside 
Australia 
15 
Skilled Employment in Australia 20 
Combination of Skilled 
Employment outside and in 
Australia  
20 
Australian Professional Year 5 
Education 20 
Specialist Education 10 
Australian Study  5 
Credentialed Community Language  5 
Study in Designated Regional Area 5 
Designated Regional Area 
Nomination/Sponsorship  
15 
State or Territory Nomination  5 







416 Adapted from “Points Table for Skilled Independent Visa (Subclass 189),” Australian Government, 
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Table 4. Points per Qualification for Subclass 188.417 
Qualifications Maximum Points for 
Subclass 188 Visa 
Age 30 
Language Skills  10 
Work Experience 10 
Business Experience—Business 
Innovation Stream Only 
15 
Investor Experience—Investor 
Stream Only  
15 
Financial Assets 35 
Business Turnover 35 
Business Innovation  15 
Special Endorsement 10 
 
The EOI applicants who choose the visa categories that require a state or territory 
nomination must pick a state or territory themselves or choose to be nominated by a state 
or territory.418 Once a relevant state or territory government agency selects an applicant, 
using their own state or territory criteria, the applicant will be invited to apply for the 
relevant visa.419 The Business Innovation and Investment Visa applicants also have to be 
nominated by a state or a territory prior to receiving an invitation to apply for the visa.420  
Skilled Independent and Skilled Work Regional (Provisional) Visa applicants, on 
the other hand, receive automatic SkillSelect invitations to apply for a visa based on their 
EOI score.421 The EOI applicants for these visas can apply with a score of 65 to enter the 
EOI pool, but that score is not enough to be invited to apply for a visa.422 Each month 
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SkillSelect indicates the minimum point threshold required to get a visa invitation, which 
serves as an indicator for the future EOI applicants.423 For instance, the minimum points 
score for both visas in April 2020 was 95.424 After the applicants receive an invitation, they 
must apply within 60 days from the day of the invitation.425 In addition to eligibility 
requirements, such as English language requirements, visa applicants must also meet health 
and character requirements and must sign an Australian values statement.426  
As in Canada, skilled program immigrants are permitted to include their family 
members in the application.427 Additionally, Australian citizens, permanent residents, or 
eligible New Zealand citizens can sponsor family-based immigrants.428 Based on various 
agreements, since the 1920s, New Zealanders and Australians have been able to migrate 
freely between the two countries.429 Since 1994, New Zealanders have been required to 
hold a temporary Special Category Visa (SCV), issued upon arrival, to visit, live, work, 
and study in Australia.430 Those New Zealanders who have obtained their SCV prior to 
February 26, 2001, may sponsor their family members for permanent residence without 
having permanent visas in Australia.431 Other New Zealand SCV holders must obtain 
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permanent visas prior to sponsoring their family members for permanent residence.432 
Australian family-based immigrants fall into the following four main categories: 
• partner—spouse, fiancé, same-sex partner, domestic partner;  
• child—dependent child, stepchild, orphan relative, adopted child; 
• parent; and  
• other family—elderly dependent relative, remaining relative, and 
caregiver.433 
Family-based immigrants must also meet health and character requirements.434 Those 
immigrants who are assessed to likely burden Australia’s public benefits system may 
require declarations of support and deferred access to welfare benefits.435 In terms of the 
Parent category, parents qualify only if more children permanently reside in Australia 
rather than in other countries.436 Additionally, the Partner category sponsors are limited in 
terms of the number of applications they can file and the time periods between 
applications.437  
Australia’s Immigration and Citizenship Program sets annual limits for total 
immigration and immigration by category. Thus, for 2019–2020, Australia’s limit is set at 
160,000 in total.438 The Skill stream is capped at 108,862, the Family stream at 47,732, 
with an additional estimated 3,350 places for children not subject to a cap, and the Special 
Eligibility stream, which includes those in special circumstances, at 236.439 In sum, like 
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Canadian economic-based immigration, the Australian system relies on points and is 
equally complex. It is administered through an online platform, SkillSelect, and allows 
applicants to include their immediate family members in the application.  
2. Drawbacks and Benefits of the Australian Immigration System 
As with the Canadian merit-based system, the Australian system has similar 
drawbacks. In Australia, skilled immigrants are also often underemployed.440 According 
to the research study conducted by the Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre, “Only 60 per 
cent of migrants from a non-English-speaking background are working in well-matched 
jobs.”441 These migrants are often underemployed because their international credentials 
are not recognized in Australia, and experience acquired in their home countries is not 
easily transferrable to the Australian context.442 These immigrants also face discrimination 
and lack strong networks and local knowledge.443 The language barrier can further 
intensify the aforementioned reasons for underemployment.444 
Like Canada, Australia is also in need of low-skilled labor, especially in nursing 
and care occupations, as its population ages.445 However, Australia’s merit-based system 
has limited immigration avenues for low-skilled workers, because the low-skilled sector 
has stayed mostly unregulated in Australia.446 Many low-skilled migrant workers are 
employed through de facto avenues.447 For instance, the Post-Study Graduate visa allows 
international students who have completed their studies to stay in Australia for up to four 
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years and to work a limited number of hours per week.448 The holders of the Post-Study 
Graduate visas often work in low-skilled jobs in the hospitality or service industries.449 The 
holders of the Working Holiday Maker Visa have also worked in low-skilled tourism and 
agricultural jobs.450 The Working Holiday Maker Visa is for individuals under 30 to work 
and travel in Australia.451 However, the holders of the Working Holiday Maker Visa are 
not required to work, and the purpose of this visa is cultural exchange.452 The employment 
of low-skilled labor in Australia through de facto means leads to various forms of 
exploitation, such as an underpayment, verbal abuse, and ethnic discrimination.453  
As the Canadian merit-based immigration system, the Australian system also has 
similar positive aspects. Like the Canadian system, the Australian immigration system has 
been adjusted multiple times over the years. In the last 10 years, several changes were made 
due to concerns regarding the overwhelming number of applications from former 
international students.454 The system had become more of an immigration pathway for 
international students, rather than the intended method for serving Australia’s economic 
needs.455 The changes involved limiting the number of acceptable occupations in line with 
labor market needs, reducing points assigned for education and experience in Australia and 
increasing points for education and English language ability, and instituting the SkillSelect 
system.456 
As in Canada, Australia attracts highly educated immigrants. According to the 
November 2019 Characteristics of Recent Migrants Survey (CoRMS), 69 percent of recent 
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immigrants to Australia held a postgraduate degree.457 In terms of skilled visa holders, 86 
percent held a postgraduate degree prior to arrival in Australia.458 Furthermore, as of 
November 2019, unemployment rates for recent immigrants and temporary visa holders 
were 5.9 percent, as opposed to 4.7 percent for the Australian-born population.459 
Permanent visa holders had an unemployment rate of 9.2 percent.460 Among skilled visa 
holders, 57 percent held two or more jobs since arrival, and 47 percent held professional 
jobs.461 
Similar to Canada, another benefit of the Australian system is immigrant integration 
services. Unlike in Canada, however, most services, such as on arrival and post arrival, are 
only available to immigrants in the humanitarian program.462 Some services, such as 
English language assistance, are also available to family and skilled migrant streams.463 
The Adult Migrant English Program (AMEP) offers up to 510 hours of English language 
tuition within the first five years of arriving in Australia or obtaining a visa.464 Moreover, 
Subclass 189, 190 and 491 visa holders are eligible for the Free Translating Service for two 
years since their visa grant or access to the service.465 Only up to 10 of certain documents, 
such as education and employment documents, are eligible to be translated.466  
 
457 “Characteristics of Recent Migrants, November 2019,” Australian Bureau of Statistics, December 6, 
2020, https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/people-and-communities/characteristics-recent-
migrants/latest-release. 
458 Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
459 Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
460 Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
461 Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
462 Joint Standing Committee on Migration, No One Teaches You to Become an Australian: Report of 
the Inquiry into Migrant Settlement Outcomes (Canberra, ACT: Department of the Senate, 2017), 10, 
https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-2825341844. 
463 Joint Standing Committee on Migration, 10. 
464 Adult Migrant English Program, English Classes for Eligible Migrants and Humanitarian Entrants 
in Australia (Australian Government: Department of Education and Training, n.d.), 1, accessed October 5, 
2020, https://ames.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/AMEP-Factsheet-Program-Information.pdf. 
465 “About This Service,” Free Translating Service, Department of Social Services, accessed October 5, 
2020, https://translating.homeaffairs.gov.au/en/about-this-service/. 
466 Free Translating Service, Department of Social Services. 
74 
In terms of public opinion on immigration, different studies and polls present 
different results.467 For instance, in a recent poll, more than two-thirds of Australians were 
not in favor of population growth in their country.468 Other polls indicated that the majority 
of Australians view immigration as beneficial to the Australian economy.469 Overall, 
Australia’s merit-based immigration system, like Canada’s, has certain disadvantages, such 
as underemployment and de facto means of low-skilled labor employment, but it also has 
benefits, including system adjustments, highly educated immigrants, and some degree of 
immigrant integration services.  
3. National Security and the Australian Immigration System  
As was mentioned earlier, individuals attempting to receive permanent residence 
or citizenship in Australia must pass the character test requirements described in section 
501 of the Migration Act of 1958.470 The individuals who may not pass the character test 
include those with a substantial criminal record, as well as those who have had an 
unfavorable security assessment issued by the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organization.471 Individuals who do not pass the character test may have their visa refused 
or canceled by the Department of Home Affairs.472 The decision regarding visa 
cancellation or refusal due to a failed character test may be issued by the Minister of Home 
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Affairs, the Minister for Immigration Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, or their 
delegates.473 
Despite the character test requirements, like Canada, Australia has had a number of 
immigrants involved in terrorist or foreign fighter activities. Rodger Shanahan identified 
183 Australians, who have either been charged with terrorism offences or joined radical 
Islamist terrorist organizations, from 2012 to 2020.474 Out of 183 whose places of birth 
were known, 95 were born in Australia, while 43 were born overseas and considered first 
generation Australians.475 According to Shanahan, Australian privacy laws restrict access 
to information regarding the type of visa immigrants used to enter Australia.476  
C. CONCLUSION 
The merit-based systems of Canada and Australia have been touted as examples the 
United States should follow when reforming its immigration system. Canadian and 
Australian immigration systems establish a potential immigrant’s eligibility for permanent 
residence through the ability to score an essential number of points as prescribed by the 
respective country’s merit-based immigration system. Canada and Australia have a two-
step point scoring system. Canada’s Express Entry system involves the submission of an 
initial application to determine if an applicant meets the minimum requirements to enter a 
pool of candidates. Subsequently, the candidates are assigned a score according to a 
Comprehensive Ranking System, and eligible applicants are invited to apply for a visa. 
Similarly, Australia’s SkillSelect system requires that an applicant obtain a minimum score 
to enter a pool of candidates. Once in the pool, the candidates, depending on the visa type, 
may be required to reach another threshold to get a visa invitation. Both countries also 
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allow for family-based immigration, and merit-based candidates may include certain 
family members in their applications. 
Merit-based immigration systems of both countries have drawbacks, such as 
underemployment of highly skilled immigrants and a shortage or de facto means of 
employment of low-skilled laborers. On the other hand, Canadian and Australian systems 
present several beneficial elements. Merit-based systems of Canada and Australia are 
nimble and attract higher-skilled immigrants. Finally, despite both countries’ testing or 
vetting their immigrants for public safety or national security concerns, they have a number 




V. ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The previous chapters examined the U.S. diversity visa and family-based 
immigration programs, as well as Canadian and Australian merit-based immigration. The 
chapters also discussed these programs in light of their economic and national security 
impacts. This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the three case studies, and 
summarizes the findings of the aforementioned programs, in terms of national security and 
economic effects. This chapter also recommends a number of changes that the United 
States can implement in its immigration system, to address perceived shortcomings.  
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
The immigration programs of three countries—the United States, Canada, and 
Australia—reveal common strengths in relation to national security. The United States’ 
DV and family-based immigration programs have extensive pre-approval vetting processes 
in place. Likewise, Canada and Australia vet immigrants for national security and public 
safety concerns prior to any grant. Despite these processes, all three countries still 
experience national security concerns, inasmuch as they have admitted individuals who 
later engaged or attempted to engage in terrorist acts. However, variances occur in terms 
of the numbers admitted by each country. For instance, according to the Macdonald-
Laurier Institute, from 2006 to 2017, 28 Canadians who immigrated to Canada were 
directly involved in Islamist terrorist or foreign fighter activities.477 In Australia, according 
to the Lowy Institute, from 2012 to 2020, 43 foreign-born Australians were involved in 
Islamist terrorist or foreign fighter activities.478 The available numbers for Canada and 
Australia only included specifically Islamist terrorist-related activities. U.S. numbers vary 
depending on the report. According to the CATO institute, from 1975 to 2015, 54 foreign-
born legal permanent residents were convicted of planning or committing a terrorist attack 
in the United States. However, according to the joint DOJ and DHS report, from 2001 to 
 
477 Wilner and Yar, “Canadian Terrorists by the Numbers.” 
478 Shanahan, “Typology of Terror.” 
78 
2016, 402 foreign-born individuals, including non-U.S. citizens and naturalized U.S. 
citizens, were convicted of terrorism-related charges in the U.S. federal courts.479  
In comparison to Canada and Australia, the numbers in the United States appear 
higher. However, these numbers pale in comparison to the thousands of immigrants who 
have become U.S. legal permanent residents annually through the DV and family-based 
immigration programs. Moreover, the numbers in the joint DOJ and DHS report include 
individuals who committed offenses within the United States and abroad and were 
convicted on charges relating directly to international terrorism or on charges where an 
investigation had a link to international terrorism.480 Thus, the numbers from the DOJ and 
DHS report were derived using a broad definition, arguably inflating the volume, by 
including individuals whose investigations identified links of any type to international 
terrorism, even if the ultimate charges did not include any terrorism-related offenses.481 In 
sum, while all three countries were unable to identify and preclude lawful entry to a small 
percentage of immigrants who engaged in terrorist acts, it is problematic to try to assess 
and rank the success or failure of each country’s national security vetting efforts, as the 
definitions used in identifying purported terrorists are not similar. 
The three countries also share strengths in regards to the economic impact of their 
immigration programs. For instance, all three countries appear to attract high percentages 
of educated immigrants. In 2016, 50 percent of the immigrants admitted to the United 
States through the DV program held a college degree or higher, and approximately one-
half of family-based immigrants who arrived in 2014 were college educated.482 Likewise, 
as of 2016, 40 percent of immigrants to Canada aged 25 to 64 had a bachelor’s degree or 
higher.483 Similarly, as of 2019, 69 percent of recent immigrants to Australia held a 
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postgraduate degree, including a bachelor’s degree, an advanced diploma, or a certificate 
level qualification.484 
Another strength among the three countries involves relatively low unemployment 
rates. In 2018, the unemployment rate for the U.S. DV immigrants was only 3.8 percent.485 
The unemployment rate for immigrants in Canada, aged 25 to 54, in 2017, was at 6.4 
percent, while the unemployment rate of permanent visa holders in Australia, in 2019, was 
9.2 percent.486 However, the unemployment rate for the U.S. family-based immigrants 
diverged from the other programs and was concerning, as in fiscal year 2018, family-based 
immigrants reported a 12 percent unemployment rate.  
The Canadian and Australian immigration systems have additional strengths in that 
they have regular system re-evaluations—that result in adjustments to their immigration 
programs—and immigrant integration services, which the U.S. immigration system lacks. 
Conversely, the U.S. immigration system has its own unique strengths. For one, the DV 
program accepts immigrants who enrich and diversify the United States culturally, who 
otherwise would have no avenue for immigration to the United States. Also, the U.S. 
family-based immigrants enrich the U.S. economically, through investing in human capital, 
innovation, and entrepreneurship, as well as aid in immigrants’ economic integration.  
When it comes to weaknesses, critics contend the DV program attracts low-skilled 
individuals, and creates financial burdens. Similarly, critics argue that U.S. family-based 
immigration diminishes the growth of the U.S. economy by admitting low-skilled 
immigrants. The Canadian and Australian immigration systems appear to have the opposite 
shortcomings. Both the Canadian and Australian merit-based systems lead to the 
underemployment of highly skilled immigrants. Additionally, the Canadian merit-based 
system creates low-skilled labor shortages, while the Australian system promulgates de-
facto means of low-skilled labor employment.  
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Overall, although the education rate for DV and family-based immigrants in the 
United States is at 50 percent and does not greatly differ from the rates in Australia and 
Canada, improvements can still be made. Moreover, while the unemployment rate of DV 
immigrants is lower than that of immigrants in Canada and Australia, the unemployment 
rate of U.S. family-based immigrants is higher than that of immigrants in Canada and 
Australia and needs to be addressed. While the United States can implement 
recommendations based on lessons learned from the Canadian and Australian immigration 
policies, it is important to acknowledge the barriers to the implementation of a merit-based 
system in the United States, as addressed in the next section.  
B. FINDINGS: BARRIERS TO A MERIT-BASED IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
In line with the comparative analysis, this thesis finds that several barriers block 
the implementation of merit-based systems in the United States. Merit-based systems 
require constant adjustments in points determination and administration, due to fluctuating 
labor market needs. Canada and Australia have institutionalized responsive systems that 
can make regular policy adjustments to their points-based systems.487 The immigration 
authorities in both countries have considerable discretion to adjust immigration to labor 
market conditions.488 Both countries have parliamentary systems of government that allow 
for such flexibility.489 The United States, on the other hand, has no such similar fluidity 
and would need to pass new regulations through the Senate and Congress, as the Executive 
branch does not have a similar discretion or leeway to adjust immigration policies.490 
Immigration visa caps are set by statute and cannot be modified by the Executive branch 
without the Legislative branch’s approval.491  
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Additionally, the population of the United States is much greater than those of 
Canada and Australia; over nine times that of Canada and 14 times that of Australia.492 
Consequently, the management of immigration is more challenging.493 Furthermore, 
Canada and Australia are not faced with the same issues facing the United States in terms 
of immigration, such as a large undocumented population.494 The United States shares a 
border with Mexico, an underdeveloped country, and “Mexicans alone represent 6 million 
of the 11 million unauthorized immigrants.”495 This majority percentage of a large volume 
of undocumented immigrants in the United States demonstrates the unique challenges 
faced at present by the United States in maintaining a well-functioning legal immigration 
system, while at the same time, contending with unlawful immigration through its porous 
southern border. Canada, though also having a lengthy and porous southern border, has the 
United States, a wealthy country, as its southern neighbor. Australia is surrounded by 
water, and is, thus, much harder to reach than the United States.496 In sum, the U.S. form 
of government and geographical location present barriers in terms of implementing a merit-
based immigration system. Nevertheless, the current U.S. immigration system would 
benefit from improvements. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Based on the assessment of the U.S. DV and family-based immigration programs 
and merit-based systems in Canada and Australia, this thesis recommends that the United 
States implement the following changes to its immigration system to improve the DV and 
family-based immigration programs and address the primary concerns of critics of both 
programs.  
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• Raise minimum educational and experiential requirements for the DV 
program 
To qualify for the DV program, an applicant must have a high school diploma or 
equivalent, or two years in a position that requires two years of training or experience 
within the last five years of the DV application.497 Although 50 percent of the DV 
applicants have more than a high school diploma, some critics still argue that DV 
immigrants do not add as much value to the United States, due to their lack of advanced 
skills.498 To address this concern, the eligibility requirements for the DV program should 
be raised to attract more highly skilled immigrants. The United States need not rank DV 
program applicants based on points, but it could require a college degree, two years of work 
experience in managerial, professional, or technical fields, and English language ability for 
25,000 of the 50,000 DV applicants.  
To implement this recommendation, Section 203(c) of the INA, which stipulates 
federal requirements for DV applicants, would have to be amended through an Act of 
Congress. If the INA were amended, the United States would have to develop an English 
proficiency test and administer it. Another option is to contract an organization that already 
has such tests, and can deliver them. To cover the costs of such testing, the United States 
could require the applicants to pay the testing fees. Additionally, the DOS, the agency that 
manages the DV program, would need to develop new standard operating procedures and 
train staff in adjudicating DV applications based on the new eligibility requirements.  
• Introduce points-based human capital criteria into family-based 
immigration 
Under the current U.S. family-based immigration system, spouses, unmarried 
minor children, unmarried and married adult children, parents, and siblings of a U.S. citizen 
or LPR may immigrate to the United States.499 Potential immigrants are required to 
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demonstrate a bona fide relationship with a U.S. citizen or an LPR, but they are not required 
to show any human capital factors.500 The United States could develop a points-based 
system, like the one in Canada or Australia, but apply it to family-based immigrants, such 
as siblings and married and unmarried adult children. Immediate family members, such as 
minor children, spouses, and parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs, would be excluded from a 
points-based system. The points would be assigned, based on age, level of education, 
official language proficiency, or work experience. The use of human capital factors in the 
context of family-based immigration would allow the United States to attract immigrants 
who would add to U.S. economic prosperity.  
To implement this recommendation, Section 203(a) of the INA, which stipulates 
allocation of visas for family-sponsored immigrants, would need to be amended through 
an act of Congress. Just as with DV eligibility requirements, federal law also stipulates 
family-based immigration requirements. The language proficiency testing and costs could 
be addressed in the same way as outlined previously in the DV program recommendation. 
Additionally, the United States would have to create an Express Entry or SkillSelect system 
to manage a points-based system for the family immigration program. The DOS and 
USCIS, two agencies responsible for administering family-based immigration, would need 
to develop new standard operating procedures and train their staff in how to adjudicate 
immigration applications based on the new eligibility requirements.  
• Institute a five-year review of the U.S. immigration system  
Although the United States does not have a points-based system like Canada and 
Australia, it still should evaluate its policies on a regular basis to make certain that its 
immigration system is meeting U.S. economic and national security needs. Thus, like 
Canada, the United States could have its immigration system re-evaluated and adjusted 
every five years. The re-evaluation of the system would fall on government agencies, such 
as the USCIS and DOS. Once the system is re-evaluated, the recommendations for changes 
could be provided to Congress for approval. As with the aforementioned recommendations, 
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this recommendation would require immigration reform through amendments to the INA 
or a new Act of Congress. In addition, it would require substantial funding to conduct 
evaluations every five years.  
• Investigate national security vetting immigrant programs using the model 
of Canada and Australia 
This thesis recommends that the U.S. government, specifically the USCIS and 
DOS, investigate the Canadian and Australian national security vetting strategies, which 
are unavailable through open-source research. Based on the investigations, the United 
States may consider adopting applicable aspects of the best vetting practices of Canada or 
Australia, or both. The investigations will require U.S. funding and the cooperation of the 
Canadian and Australian governments.  
• Implement additional measures to reduce identity fraud in the DV program 
The DOS should establish better working relationships with local governments 
when it comes to detecting immigration fraud. These types of relationships allow for better 
screening of identity documents, and for detecting fraud. The limitation to this 
recommendation is corruption among foreign government officials.501 At some consular 
posts, DV applicants have purchased authentic documents with false information from their 
countries’ corrupt government officials.502 Thus, it might be difficult to establish working 
relationships with corrupt and self-interested government officials.  
• Reduce financial burdens associated with the DV program 
DV processing fees are collected only from the DV winners.503 As stated 
previously, the U.S. government had to pay $840,000 program costs in fiscal year 2002 for 
costs not covered by the collected fees.504 Some of the costs arose from the fraud concerns 
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presented by the program.505 Some embassies and consulates lack adequate personnel or 
resources to investigate fraud concerns thoroughly.506 Many costs of processing diversity 
visas can be covered if the government were to charge even a nominal fee, such as $10 for 
every DV application. The additional revenue generated by these fees can lead to more 
extensive national security and fraud screenings. For instance, more DOS fraud managers 
can be stationed overseas to conduct investigations and review documents. Section 636 of 
Public Law 104-208 allows the government to collect a fee for a DV visa and sets it at a 
level where the DOS recovers costs associated with processing these visas.507 However, 
additional advisory legislation may be needed to extend the fee collection to all program 
applicants. Moreover, in March 2005, the DOS was able to raise the processing fee for DV 
winners from $100 to $375 to cover all program costs.508 Nonetheless, exploring a practical 
way to collect a fee from all DV applicants can benefit the DV program even further.  
D. CONCLUSION  
Although the DV and family-based programs present certain national security and 
economic concerns, the DV program should not be eliminated and family-based 
immigration should not be substantially reduced. Both programs add significant value to 
U.S. society by diversifying its population and enriching the United States economically. 
Nonetheless, the U.S. DV and family-based immigration programs could benefit from 
further improvements. The United States needs to identify and implement ways to 
minimize the potential national security and economic challenges posed by the programs. 
The United States could also find ways to reap more benefits from both programs. The 
improvements to the DV and family-based immigration in terms of national security and 
economic concerns are worthy of further study.  
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